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WORLDURBANIZATION AND THE PROBLEMS
OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
Representatives from 132 nations assembled in Vancouver
in June of last year to convene Habitat, the United Nations
Conference on Human Settlements. The conference was a
global inquiry into solutions of the critical and urgent problems of
human settlements created by the convergence of two historic events:
unprecedentedly high rates of population growth and massive rural-to-
urban migration.
World population in 1975 numbered about 4 billion and exhibited a
growth rate of just under 2 percent a year. At this rate of growth the
world's population would double in about 35 years and would total ap-
proximately 6.5 billion by the end of this century.
Figure 10-1 illustrates the enormous increase in the speed with
which world population has grown during the past three centuries.
From the beginning of human time to 1650, world population grew to a
total of about a half biffion. The second half billion came by 1830, and
the second billion was added in only another hundred years. It took
just 30 years to increase this total to 3 billion and the fourth billion
came a little over 15 years later.
Urban population growth has been even more explosive (Figure
10-2). Roughly 1.6 billion people—40 percent of the world's popula-
tion—live in urban areas today. At the beginning of the last century
The author is indebted to Frans Willekens for programming and carrying out the

































Source: Berelson (2)(1974), p.4.
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Source: United Nations (34) (1976), p. 3.
Figure10-2.Growth of the World's Urban and Rural Populations: 1800-2000
(in millions).
theurban population of the world totaled only 25 million. The United
Nations estimates that about 3.1 billion people, twice the size of
today's urban population, will be living in urban areas by the year
2000.
Rapid rates of population growth and urbanization occurred first
among nations that first experienced modernization. Thus, for two-
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veryrecently, generally after World War II.Itis convenient,
therefore, to examine the population situation separately for the
developed and the less developed parts of the world.
Urbanization in Developed and Less Developed Countries
Less than one-third of the world's population lives in developed
parts of the world, defined by the United Nations to comprise all of
Europe, Northern America, Japan, Temperate South America,
Australia and New Zealand, and the Soviet Union. The rest of the
world's people, about 2.9 biffion of them, live in the economically
poorer, less developed world.
Birth rates in less developed countries are, on the average, about
twice as high as those in developed countries. Although death rates in
the former also exceed those in the latter, the gap is smaller and
becoming narrower. The difference between births and deaths is
natural increase, and rates of natural increase in the less developed
world far exceed those in the developed nations. Consequently, the
population growth rate of the less developed countries is two and a
half times that of the developed (2.4 percent against 0.9 percent); and
their share of the global population total is rapidly increasing and is
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Source: Keyfltz (1976). p. 29.





and Less Developed152Alternatives for Growth Mi
Alarge proportion of the population of the less developed world is
engaged in agriculture. In consequence, a relatively small fraction of
LESSDEVELOPED C thispopulation is urban—only about one-fourth. The corresponding
fraction for the developed world is close to seven-tenths (Figure 10-4). UEVELOPEDCO
Butbecause of their considerably larger share of the world's popula-
tion, less developed countries today have as large an urban population
AUSTRALIA& NEW
asdo the developed countries, each having an urban population of just NORTHERN
underfour-fifths of a biffion people.
Urban populations are growing much more rapidly than the total
populations of which they are a part. Table 10-1 shows that this is LATIN
speciallytrue in the less developed world. Between 1950 and 1970 the ASIA(EXCLUDIN
totalpopulation of the developed countries increased by 26 percent,
and that of the less developed countries by 54 percent; during the same
period the urban population of the developed countries grew by 57 per-
cent, while that of the less developed countries increased by over 146
percent. Source: Berelson (19
The latest United Nations projections of urban populations up to Figure 10-4Pe
the year 2000 for seven major areas of the world are graphed in Figure
10-5. These are drawn on a logarithmic scale so that parallel slopes
depict equal rates of growth. They indicate that urban growth rates in
Europe, Northern America, and the Soviet Union are likely to slow
down to relatively moderate levels, whereas those of East and South
Asia, Latin America, and Africa are likely to continue to be com-
paratively high. Between 1975 and the year 2000 the urban population
of Europe is likely to increase by a third, that of Northern America and
the Soviet Union by one-half. It may double in East Asia, treble in
South Asia and Africa and grow two and a half times in Latin o
America. i
Historically,urban growth and urbanization have occurred
together, but they do not measure the same attribute to national
population. Urban growth refers to an increase in the number of people
living in urban settlements. Urbanization refers to a rise in proportion
of a total population that is concentrated in urban settlements. The
latter measure, therefore, is a function not only of urban growth but
also of rural growth (Figure 10-6). Thus urban growth can occur
without any urbanization if the rural population increases at a rate
equal to or greater than that of the urban population.
Table 10-2 traces the urbanization process in the world's developed
and less developed regions and in eight of its major geographical areas.
In striking contrast to the substantial differences among urban
growth rates in Table 10-1 and Figure 10-5, differences in the rates of
urbanization are relatively minor, except in three instances. The Soviet Source: United Nati
Union and Latin America exhibit above-average rates of urbanization;
F•15 inOceania the pace of urbanization is below average. Urbanization in
Iguredeveloped world is
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Source: United Nations (34) (1976), p.21.
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Figure 10-6.Rural Population, 1950-2000, in Seven Major Areas.
Table 10-2.Estimated and Projected Percentage of Population (Medium Variant)



















World Total 28.57 33.72 37.40 39.2741.15 45.19 49.63
More Developed
Regions 53.35 60.08 66.20 69.15 71.94 77.02 81.36
Less Developed
Regions 15.65 20.93 25.04 27.34 29.76 35.0340.80
Africa 13.20 17.60 21.90 24.45 27.09 32.47 37.73
LatinAmerica 40.90 48.51 56.85 60.4263.76 69.74 74.80
Northern America 63.65 69.83 74.15 76.53 78.78 82.88 86.41
EastAsia 16.55 24.63 28.53 30.66 32.90 37.73 43.19
SouthAsia 15.53 18.05 21.09 22.96 24.97 29.59 35.04
Europe 54.79 59.22 64.67 67.15 69.57 74.31 78.73
Oceania 64.46 65.92 70.18 71.63 73.06 75.77 78.20
USSR 39.36 48.97 56.57 60.51 64.22 70.83 76.34
Source: United Nations(1976), p. 54. (34) Latin America rMigration, Urbanization, Resources, & Development157
theremaining regions, however, may be seen to be proceeding at a
relatively similar pace, with percentage urban shares increasing by ap-
proximately one-half of a percent every year. The differences are a con-


















The Problems of Human Settlements
Problems of urbanization are problems of national human settle-
ment systems: those networks of spatially dispersed concentrations of
people and economic activities. Cities, towns, and urban agglomera-
tions are nodal centers of life in modern societies, and changes in ur-
banization trends appear as changes in the spatial and hierarchically
structured patterns of such centers.
The major problems of urbanization arise because urban growth is
polarized and spatially imbalanced. Growth does not generally occur
proportionally at all nodes of a national settlement system. Particular-
ly in less developed countries, it usually falls unequally on the larger
(20,000 or more) and often already overcrowded centers of urban life
(Table 10-3).
Regional disparities in rates of urban growth are even more
dramatic at the level of the individual urban settlement. Table 10-4
sets out recent United Nations projections of the growth of some of
the less developed world's largest urban centers. The size of the
population growth multiplier, the urban momentum, for some cities is
truly awesome. During the 25 years between 1975 and 2000, Lima,
Mexico City, Jakarta, and Teheran all are expected to triple their
populations; Sao Paulo and Seoul are projected to grow by a factor of
2.5; and Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Lagos, and Kinshasa are to increase
fourfold.
As with rapid population growth in general, rapid urban growth in-
creases the difficulties of providing a population with the necessary
sustenance, employment, services, and infrastructure. A rapidly
burgeoning urban population strains health and education budgets,
complicates the reduction of unemployment levels, and exacerbates
problems connected with provision of adequate supplies of food,
energy, housing, water, and transport and sanitary facilities. The
"demographic investment" needed just to maintain present doubling
or tripling of institutional plant within the next 25 years. That these
areas are to be found mostly in countries least able to afford such an in-
vestment only multiplies the difficulties associated with the resolution
of human settlement problems.
The magnitude of the accumulating demands for services and in-
frastructure in less developed countries may be illustrated with data
on the provision of housing. According to the 1965 United Nations
estimate (Table 10-5), the less developed regions of Africa, Asia, and
Latin America required the construction of 392 million housing units158Alternatives for Growth















country lation lation latiOna or more or more or more
SouthAsia 2.1 1.8 3.4 4.3 4.6 4.8
India 1.9 1.8 2.3 3.5 3.9 4.0
Turkey 2.8 2.3 4.7 6.8 6.6 7.4
Philippines 3.0 2.2 5.1 4.0 4.1 3.8
Thailand 3.0 2.2 8.3 6.9 5.3 4.9
Iraq 2.9 2.0 4.3 6.6 6.9 N.A.
LatinAmerica 2.8 1.3 4.5 5.5 5.5 5.8
Brazil 3.0 1.5 5.2 6.3 5.8 6.8
Mexico 3.0 1.5 7.8 6.9 7.8 7.3
Colombia 2.8 1.2 5.0 6.6 7.5 9.4
Chile 2.3 —0.2 3.7 4.7 4.1 5.1
Peru 2.3 1.2 3.7 6.0 5.3 4.7
Africa 2.1 1.6 4.5 5.4 6.5 5.3
Egyptb 2.4 1.5 4.1 4.1 4.9 3.5
Nigeria 2.6 2.1 5.4 7.6 11.6 N.A.
Algeria 2.3 1.1 5.5 7.1 6.3 3.4
Zaire 1.9 1.1 4.9 10.8 6.9 N.A.
NA.Not applicable.
aAccording to the national definition of an urban area.
bUnited Arab Republic.
Source: Farooq (1975), p. 137, (9)
during the fifteen-year period 1960-1975, with almost three-fourths of
this total being required in Asia. This means that an average annual
construction of 19.4 million housing units had to be built to satisfy
demands arising from population increase, replacement of obsolescent
stock, and elimination of existing shortages. Translated into per capita
terms, the estimated requirement for this region is about eleven units
per thousand population. Available statistics indicate that in most
countries in Asia less than two housing units per thousand population
were built each year during the 1960s (Mok, 1975, p. 98).
Rapid rates of urban population increase are but one element of the
demands generated by growth. Increased consumption arising out of a
growing per capita income also plays an important role. Continued ur-
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Multiple In crease over
Base Year
1950 1975 2000 1950-19 75 1975-2000
Cairo, Egypt 2.4 6.9 16.4 2.9 2.4
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 0.2 1.1 4.2 4.8 3.9
Nairobi, Kenya 0.1 0.7 3.4 5.5 4.5
Lagos, Nigeria 2.9 2.1 9.4 7.2 4.6
Kinshasa, Zaire 0.2 2.0 9.1 12.5 4.4
Mexico City. Mexico 2.9 10.9 31.6 3.8 2.9
S'o Paulo, Brazil 2.4 10.0 26.0 4.1 2.6
Bogota, Colombia 0.7 3.4 9.5 5.2 2.8
Guayaquil, Ecuador 0.3 1.0 3.1 4.0 3.1
Lima, Peru 0.6 3.9 12.1 6.4 3.1
Jakarta, Indonesia 1.6 5.6 16.9 3.6 3.0
Teheran, Iran 1.0 4.4 13.8 4.3 3.1
Seoul, Korea 1.0 7.3 18.7 7.1 2.6
Karachi, Pakistan 1,0 4.5 15.9 4.3 3.6
Bangkok. Thailand 1.0 3.3 11.0 3.4 3.4
growth rate of urban per capita income of a similar level, means an an-
nual growth rate of total urban income and demand for goods and ser-
vices of about 9 percent. Compounded over the 30 years from 1970 to
the end of the century, such a rate leads to a thirteenfold increase in
throughput of materials and services.
This rate of increase is hard to comprehend. It means, for example, that
the metropolitan area of Mexico City, which in 1970 generated about $8
billion in total income (assuming that per capita income was $1,000 and
population 8 million), would have a total income of $104 billion in the
year 2000. This figure is greater than the total income today of any coun-
try in the world with the exception of the United States, the Soviet
Union, West Germany, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom. [Ridker
and Crosson, 1975, p. 217.1
An examination of future prospects for world population growth
and urbanization reveals very forcefuly that the twin historic
developments that have combined to create the problems of human
settlements today will continue for the rest of this century and beyond
in most parts of the world. The rate of world population growth,
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Table 10-5.Estimated Housing Needs of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, THE DEMOGR,
1960-1975(millions of dwelling units)
Housingrequired to
Average Annual Requirements Total
Requirements,
1960-1975 1960-1965 1965-1970 1970-1975
pro tide for: UrbanRuralUrbanRuralUrbanRuralUrbanRural
Population increase
Africa 0.4 0.9 0.5 1.0 0.7 1.1 7.8 14.7
Asia 2.2 4.0 2.7 4.2 3.2 4.5 41.0 62,1
Latin America 0.9 0.4 1.3 0.3 1.5 0.3 18.7 4.8
Subtotal 3.5 5.3 4.5 5.5 5.4 5.7 67.5 81.6
Replacement of
obsolescent stock
Africa 0.1 1.1 0.1 1.1 0.1 1.1 1.8 16.1
Asia 1.1 6.3 1.1 6.3 1.1 6.3 16.594.0
Latin America 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.7 4.1 10.3
Subtotal 1.5 8.1 1.5 8.1 1.5 8.1 22.4120.4
Elimination of
existing shortages
Africa 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.7 1.8 10.7
Asia 0.7 4.2 0.7 4.2 0.7 4.2 14.6 62.6
Latin America 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5 3.4 6.9
Subtotal 1.0 5.4 1.0 5.4 1.0 5.4 19.880.2
Total 6.0 18.8 7.0 18.0 7.9 19.2109.7282.2
Accelerated rat
consequences of























Source: Mok (23) (1975), p. 99.
come, and rural-urban migration shows no signs of abating in most of
the less developed world. Therefore, the number of people in the world
willcontinueto increase in the near future, as will the proportion of
people living in urban settlements. Populations in urban centers wifi
continue to grow at an alarming rate, particularly in the larger urban
agglomerations of the less developed world. The problems created by
this transformation are manifold and involve large private and social
costs. But there are obvious benefits too, and it is important to keep
these in mind when considering policies for intervening in the ur-
banization process. A better understanding of the dynamics and conse-
quences of urban-rural population growth and economic development
appears to be an essential ingredient of such considerations, and this
requires a focus on the processesofchange together with their
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Latin America, THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
Accelerated rates of population growth and urbanization are direct
consequences of higher rates of natural increase (births minus deaths)
_________
andrates of net urban migration (urban immigration minus urban out-
_____________
migration).Explanations of temporal and spatial variations in the pat-
terns exhibited by these two sets of rates generally have taken the
form of descriptive generalizations phrased in terms of transitions or
revolutions. Specifically, the vital revolution is commonly held to be
the process whereby societies with high birth and death rates move to
a situation of low birth and death rates. The mobility revolution is the
transformation experienced by societies with low migration rates as




As traditional,largelyiffiterate,rural and agricultural-based
populations have become transformed into modern, largely literate, ur-
ban, industrial-service dominated societies, they have at the same time
moved from high levels to low levels of mortality and fertility. The
belief that such a transition inevifably follows modernization has
fostered the now often-voiced view that "development is the best con-
traceptive."
The general description of the vital revolution was originally
developed some fifty years ago as an explanation of the demographic
experiences of nineteenth-century Europe. This revolution begins with
the control of deaths. Improvements in health care, in sanitation, in
general standards of living, in nutrition, and in personal cleanliness all
act to postpone death and to reduce mortality rates.
Control over deaths is followed, after some lag, by control over
births. The principal factor underlying the reduction of the birth rate
appears to be the voluntary regulation of fertility. The lag between the
onset of mortality decline and that of fertility decline creates an asym-
metry that leads to rapid population growth due to natural increase
(Figure 10-7).
The changes in fertility and mortality that constitute the vital
revolution are more readily understood if developed and less developed
countries of the world are considered separately. The birth rate in the
less developed world in 1960 was approximately 42.8 per thousand,
while that in the developed world was half that. The death rate in the
less developed regions also was higher than that of the developed
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Source:Coale (4) (1969), p.66.
Figure10-7.Dependency Burden, Annual Rate of Increase, and Relative Size
of Population Aged 15 to 64 Years: Two Alternative Projections. +
betweenthe two birth rates. As a result the population of the
developed countries in 1960 was growing at a rate of 12.5 per thou-
sand, whereas that of the less developed countries was increasing at
the rate of 22.5 per thousand.
Because of their much higher fertility, less developed nations have a
much "younger" age composition than developed countries, and
therefore a far greater built-in tendency for further growth. A country
with a recent history of high birth rates, such as Mexico, for example,
exhibits an age pyramid with a broad base that tapers off sharply at
the older age groups. A country with a history of low birth rates, such
as Sweden, on the other hand, has an age composition that yields an
almost rectangular age pyramid (Figure 10-8).
Populations in which children outnumber parents potentially have a
larger number of parents in the next generation than today and
therefore acquire a built-in momentum for further growth, even if their
fertility immediately drops to bare replacement level. Bare replace-
ment level under conditions to modern mortality means that each
family reduces its fertility to about 2.1 to 2.3 children on the average.
If average family size in developing countries dropped to bare replace-
ment immediately, this would produce a zero growth population only
after 80 years or more and one that would then be about two-thirds
larger than the current one (Figure 10-9). If the drop were to take about
70 years to achieve, then this increase would be 450 percent. In other
words, the momentum with the immediate fertility decline is about
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Source: Berelson (1974), p.12.

























Source: Berelson (1974), p. 13.
Figure10-9. Momenta of Population Growth for Developed and Less Devel-
oped Countries.164Alternatives for Growth Mi
Populationsin all developed countries have gone through a process ILTransitiona4
of demographic change in which a decline in mortality eventually was this phase i
followed by a drop in fertility. Demographers refer to this transforma- fertility. Th
tionasthedemographictransition,andassociateitwith crease is a
socioeconomic changes that arise during a nation's industrialization which gradi
and modernization. Although the process has been far from uniform, III. Modern So
and its linkages with changes in socioeconomic variables have not been urban migr
clearly identified, the universality of this revolution in developed coun- migration d
tries is nevertheless quite impressive, population
The vital revolution deals only with vital rates and neglects internal glomeratior
displacements attributable to migration. This latter contributor to
spatial demographic change also exhibits a historical pattern—one In the premo
that is described by the generalization known as the mobility revolu- thneteenth-cent
tio Africa, indivicju
distances was
The Mobility Revolution transportation,
The primarily temporal aspect of the vital revolution has a spatial spatially distant
counterpart that Zelinsky has called the mobility transition or revolu- strong social ti
tion, describing it in the following terms: whose demograp
Such societies w
There are definite, patterned regularities in the growth of personal Phase II begli
mobility through space-time during recenthistory, and these tion. Physical an
regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization pro- incentives for ti
cess.... A transition from a ...conditionof severely limited physical populations exp
and social mobility toward much higher rates of such movement always structural chan
occurs as a community experiences the process of modernization. [Zelin- bine to impel mc
sky, 1971, pp. 221-22.] improved social
Zelinsky's hypothesis is that for any specific community the vital directed mostly
and the mobility revolutions follow a parallel transitional sequence. He During the ft.
argues that as humanity has extended its control first over deaths and migration and C
thenover births, it also has increased people's ability to move from one movement. Rur
community to another. Thus, whereas in premodern societies oppor- rural popuiatioi
tunities for territorial movement were limited, in most modern flow. This late s
societies many individuals can migrate without major difficulties. The and it appears t
transition from the premodern to the modern condition is the mobility and in the Feder
revolution, and its three principal phases appear to be:1 The hypothes
national socioec
I.Premodern Society. High fertility and mortality, low natural in- casions and has
crease, and little geographical mobility. studies (e.g., Ze
__________________
1976).Residenti
1 . ... . . . . 1-yearrate of 9
This three-way division essentially collapses Zehnsky s five phases. The first is his
7re orts a premodern traditional society; the second combines his early and late transitional
societies; and the third represents his advanced and superadvanced societies. from about 5.8Migration, Urbanization, Resources, & Development165
througha process II.Transitional Society. A decline in mortality in the early stages of
ly eventually was this phase is followed, after a lag, by a corresponding decline in
this transforma- fertility. The lag produces a rapid increase in population. This in-
sociateitwith crease is accompanied by massive rural-to-urban migration,
industrialization which gradually rises to a peak and then slackens.
ar from uniform, III. Modern Society. Low fertility and mortality. Vigorous urban-to-
les have not been urban migration and intraurban commuting. Net rural-to-urban
coun- migration declines and may even take on negative values as the
population increasingly shifts outward from metropolitan ag-
neglects internal glomerations toward smaller communities.
r contributor to
,cal pattern—one In the premodern traditional societies of medieval Europe, early
mobility revolu- nineteenth-century Japan, and mos.t of pre-Worid War II Asia and
Africa, individually motivated migration over substantial physical
distances was relatively uncommon. Difficulties of long-distance
transportation, low levelsof communication exchange between
ion has a spatial spatially distant localities, minimal disposable per capita incomes, and
cisition or revolu- strong social ties all contributed to the evolution of communities
whose demographic growth was relatively undisturbed by migration.
Such societies were in Phase I of the mobility revolution.
ith of personal Phase II begins with the onset of industrialization and moderniza-
ry,and these tion. Physical and social barriers to internal migration decline and the
jernization pro- incentives for territorial movement increase. Rapidly growing rural
imited physical populations experiencing the second phase of the vital revolution and
)vement always structural changes in the technology of agricultural production com-
mzation. [Zehn- bine to impel increasing numbers of individuals to migrate in search of
improved social and economic opportunities. This geographical shift is
nunity the vital directed mostly toward the larger urban centers.
nal se uence He During the final phase of the mobility revolution, urban-to-urban
over deaths and migration and commuting are the predominant forms of territorial
o move from one movement. Rural-to-urban migration declines and its decrement to
societies oor- rural population may be more than offset by the size of the reverse
imostmirn flow. This late stage of Phase III has been called counterurbanization,
difficulties The and it appears to be occurring today in the United States, in Sweden,
n is the mobility and in the Federal Republic of Germany (Morrison and Wheeler, 1976).
The hypothesis that rates of internal migration rise in the course of
national socioeconomic development has been proposed on several oc-
low natural in- casions and has received empirical support in a number of empirical
studies (e.g., Zelinski, 1971; Parish, 1973; and Long and Boertlein,
1976). Residential mobility in Japan, for example, has increased from a
1-year rate of 9.5 percent in 1960 to 12.8 percent in 1970. Kuroda
a7. The first is hi (1973) reports a parallel rise in Japan's interdistrict migration rate
ed societies, from about 5.8 percent in the early 1950s to approximately 8 percentT
166Alternatives for Growth
in1970. A simple plot of these rates against per capita income as a
proxy for development and modernization suggests a decidedly
0.
positiveassociation.
Data for nations in the late stages of modernization indicate that
rates of geographical mobility ultimately tend to stabilize and perhaps
even decline. For example, annual migration data for the United
States between 1948 and 1971 exhibit insignificant year-to-year varia- o.
tions in the rate of residential mobility (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1976). Figure 10-10 shows that a slight decline may have occurred in
the United States during the decade of the 1960s. 0
Risingincome and declining family size give households more
freedom to move. Thus increased economic development and reduced
fertility levels should raise rates of internal migration. But other fac-
tors push in the reverse direction. Economic development stimulates
the labor force participation of wives, and working wives reduce the Source: L.H. Long a
ease with which couples can relocate. Low fertility populations have a Figure 10-10Re comparatively high proportion of the aged, whose rates of migration 1960 Where So Idi
are relatively low. This compositional effect acts to reduce aggregate
movement rates. The gradual reductions of regional differentials in
well.being that seem to follow modernization dampen some of the
stimulus for migration. Finally, the improved locational accessibility
characteristic of modern societies allows people to increasingly
substitute commuting for migration.
The transitional society of Phase II of the mobility revolution ex-
periences the particular form of population redistribution that is ur-
banization. As Kingsley Davis has observed, this is a new and relative-
ly recent step in the social evolution of human society.
Although cities themselves first appeared some 5,500 years ago,...
[blefore 1850 no society could be described as predominantly urbanized,
and by 1900 only one—Great Britain—would be so regarded. Today,...
all industrial nations are highly urbanized, and in the world as a whole
the process of urbanization is accelerating rapidly. [Davis, 1965, pp. 41-
53.]
Source: Davis (1965
Urbanization is a finite process all nations go through in the course Figure 10-1
of their transition from an agrarian to an industrial society. Such ur-
banization transitions can be depicted by attenuated S-shaped curves
(Figure 10-11). These tend to show a swift rise around 20 percent, a momentum" is
flattening out at a point somewhere between 40 and 60 percent, and a was described a
halt or even a decline in the proportion urban at levels above 75 per- of the former i
cent. 10-12 documen
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Source: Davis (1965), p. 47.
Figure 10-11.HistoricalEvolution ofPopulation ClassedasUrban.
momentum"is the spatial counterpart of the growth momentum that
was described as part of the vital revolution. In most instances the size
of the former is considerably larger than that of the latter. Figure
10-12 documents this for the case of India today. The principal spatial


















Source: L.H. Long and C.G. Boertlein (1976), pp. 3 and 17.
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Figure 10-12.Urbanization Momenta of India's Population.
TheDemographics of Urbanization
Urbanization results from a particular spatial interaction of the
vital and the mobility revolutions. It is characterized by distinct
urban-rural differentials in fertility-mortality levels and patterns of
decline, and by a massive net transfer of population from rural to ur-
ban areas through internal migration.
The few theoretical statements that have sought to explain the ur-
banization process seem to concur that this social phenomenon
generally evolves physically in the following sequence (e.g., Gibbs,
1963):
1.During the initial period of city formation the rate of urban growth
is exceeded by the rate of rural growth.
2.At some point in the history of the nation or region, a reversal oc-
curs and the urban growth rate outstrips the rate of increase of the
rural population, thereby initiating the growth of urbanization.
3.Eventually a "turning point" is reached as the proportion of the
population that is urban exceeds 50 percent for the first time.
4.With the continuous decline in agriculture's share of the total
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5.In the late stages of industrialization, a decentralization of urban
population occurs within urban centers and beyond, producing a
more dispersed spatial pattern of population. In some instances
rural (nonfarm) growth overtakes and once again exceeds urban
growth.
Figure 10-3 illustrates the path followed by urban and rural growth
rates in the United States as the nation was transformed from a 5 per-
cent urban population in 1790 to a 70 percent urban population in
1960. Already in the second stage of the above sequence in 1790, the
nation reached the "turning point" just before 1920 and entered the
fourth stage in the late 1940s. It currently is well into the fifth stage
and recently has experienced the second reversal in growth rates: rural
growth rates once again are higher than urban rates of growth (Mor-
rison and Wheeler, 1976).
The pattern illustrated in Figure 10-13 for the United States seems
to have some generality and apparently has also occurred in other
countries, such as the Soviet Union:
After more than a century of rising rates of increase in the urban popula-
tion, from an average of 1.3 per cent per annum early in the 19th century
to 6.5 per cent per annum average for the period between the censuses of
1926 and 1939, the Soviet Union is now experiencing declining growth
rates. The highest rates of urban growth were achieved.. .whenthe pro-
portion of urban population was still low... [and] the peak was reached
in 1938 with an increase of 12.2 per cent in one year....Butthe long-
range trend has been downward with average annual increases of 4.1 per
cent, 1950-1959, and 2.8 per cent, 1959-1970. A study of individual
years. reveals a drop from 4.6 per cent in 1958 to 2.3 per cent in 1969, or
a decline of one-half in a dozen years. [Harris, 1975, p. 77.]
If urbanization is a finite process, what are the spatial population
dynamics that underlie it? How do urban and rural birth, death, and
migration rates vary over time to produce the paths taken by urban
and rural growth rates in countries such as the United States? We
shall examine the three components of population change in turn, star-
ting with mortality. Since the necessary data are very scarce and, in
many instances, nonexistent, much of our discussion must necessarily
be speculative.
Factors affecting mortality are likely to differ between urban and
rural areas. Health care facilities, for example, are more readily
available in urban areas. The number of deaths attributed to con-
tagious diseases or automobile accidents, on the other hand, is apt to170Alternatives for Growth
Source: Eldridge and Thomas (8) (1964). p. 194.
Figure10-13.Annual Growth Rates of Urban and Rural Populations in the
United States: 1790-1960.
belower in rural areas. On balance it appears that post-1930 rural mor-
tality exceeds urban mortality levels, although in developed countries
the differences have been narrowed considerably (Table 10-7). A recent
United Nations calculation estimates the urban death rate around
1960 to have been "almost 8 points less than the rural in Africa, about
6 points less in East Asia and South Asia, and considerably less also in
Oceania; in Europe and Northern America, on the other hand, the dif-
ference, if any, could have been only slight" (United Nations, 1974, pp.
17-18).
The fertility of urban women is lower than that of rural women vir-
tually everywhere (Table 10-7). The principal factors associated with
lowered birth rates—such as education, income, labor-force participa-
tion of women, age at marriage—are all correlates of urbanization.
Thus fertility decline has tended to spread from city to village and
from village to farm. United Nations estimates of urban and rural
crude birth rates around 1960 revealed that "the urban crude birth
rate was in general considerably below the rural crude birth rate. Only
in Northern America was the difference rather slight. In Europe the
rural birth rate exceeded the urban by 4 points, in East Asia and South
Asia by about 7 points, in Latin America by 9 points, and in Oceania
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Table 10-6.Component Rates of Population Growth: World
1960 (percentages)
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Thedifference between the birth rate and the death rate is natural
increase, and rural natural increase exceeded the urban in most parts
of the world in 1960 (Table 10-7). Yet urban areas have been growing
much more rapidly than rural areas. Clearly, the component of change
fostering this growth is migration.
The urban population of the Soviet Union was growing at an annual
rate of approximately 2.5 percent during the early 1970s. At the same
time its rural population was declining at the annual rate of 1.1 per-
cent. The urban growth rate was the sum of a rate of natural increase
of 0.9 and a net migration rate of 1.6 percent. The urban rate of natural
increase, in turn, was the difference between a birth rate of 17 per thou-
sand and a death rate of 8 per thousand. The net migration rate was
the difference between an inmigration rate of 27 per thousand and an
outmigration rate of 11 per thousand. Expressing these rates on a per
capita basis, we have the fundamental accounting identity (Rogers,
1976):
=(b—d)+ (i —o)=n+ m
=(0.017—0.008)+ (0.027 —0.011)=0.009+ 0.016 (10.1)
= —0.025
The corresponding identity for the rural population was:
= (b,—dr)+ (r —or)= nr + m,
= (0.019—0.009)+ (0.014 —0.035)=0.010—0.021 (10.2)
=—0.011
We may contrast the above data for the Soviet Union, which is
about 56 percent urban, with corresponding data for India, which is
only 20 percent urban. The two accounting identities for India in the
late 1960s were, respectively (Rogers and Willekens, 1976):
and:
= (0.030—0.010)+ (0.027 —0.010)=0.020+ 0.017




Observe that the outmigration rates from urban areas in both coun-
tries are almost identical (0.011 and 0.0 10), and note that the rural out-
migration rate in India is lower than its urban outmigration rate. The
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Table 10-7.Component Rates of Urban and Rural Population Growth: World
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33.0 27.7 11.6 12.5 39.8 19.1
23.5 20.1 8.9 —2.6 23.3 9.3
45.5 37.9 15.4 16.5 44.1 21.7
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Source: United Nations (34) (1976), pp. 5 1-52.
34.5 20.8 6.5 —1.4 26.5 8.4I
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transferof people from rural to urban areas, but a closer examination ALTERNATIVE I
of the fundamental accounting identity in Equation (10.1) readily URBANIZATION
shows that no such contradiction is implied.
Return migration and the much larger base population in rural India In a now classican
together account for much of the level of observed outmigration from ty reduction, Ansle
urban areas. To see this more clearly we may rewrite Equation (10.1) the population cha
as: to their poverty an
their modernizatjoi
=—d+I—u
Or— (10.5) Coale focused o
consequently cou1
where visthe fraction of the population that is urban. Since India's migration. Moreo'
population is about 20 percent urban and 0,.is0.0007, we find that: averted, at least ii
future course for i
= Or=-0.007 = 0.028 (10.6) maintained. Thus
0.20 variableconsidere
which is what we had in Equation (10.3) (except for a unit difference in
the third decimal place due to rounding). We shall be conc
Equation (10.5) may be rearranged to give: capita income am
native possible fu
O= Or+(n —r) (10.7) considered are thi
contrasting alten
a relationship which reveals that so long as uissmall, oislikely to be per cent of the ir
U twenty-fiveyears large. Thus, for India, we have:
After generating t
Ou=4(0.007) + (—0.017)0.010 (10.8) went on to exam
I would have on thi
whereas the corresponding data for the Soviet Union give:
First, the bur
0=0.78(0.035) + (—0.016) = 0.011 (10.9) sons in the popul
- teento sixty-fou
Curiously, both sets of data yield nearly identical values2 for oand precisely, the am
—T,. sixty-four;and t
the number of p
2This near equivalence suggests the potentially more useful alternative rearrange- resources. Then
ment of Equation (10.5): dependency, rati
o,. =—[°+ —)] (10.10) capita income. [(
In both the Soviet Union and in India the quantity in the square brackets is 0.027. In this section
When this quantity may be assumed to be approximately fixed (which is likely to hold focus on some of
only for countries not yet over 60 percent urban), then one can crudely estimate the Because thi rural-to-urban migration rate to be about 0.027 u/i —u.This would give Mexico, for ex-
ample, which in 1970 was roughly 59 percent urban, a rural-to-urban migration rate of teractrng populat
0.039. With a birth rate of 44 per thousand and a death rate of 10 per thousand, Mex- begin by descrlbl
ico's urban population should then have been increasing at an annual rate of approx- population scenai
imately 7.3 per annum. The reported rate for the 1950-1960 decade was 7.8 percent these alternative (Table 10-3),unit difference in
(10.7)
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ALTERNATIVEPROJECTIONS OF
URBANIZATION
In a now classic analysis of the demoeconomic consequences of fertili-
ty reduction, Ansley Coale (1969) examined some of the ways in which
the population characteristics of less developed countries are related
to their poverty and how alternative demographic trends might affect
their modernization.
Coale focused on nations rather than regions within nations, and
consequently could ignore population gains or losses arising through
migration. Moreover, he assumed that widespread famine could be
averted, at least in the short run, and therefore posited only a single
future course for mortality—a reduction that could be achieved and
maintained. Thus fertility was left as the sole population-change
variable considered to be responsive to government policy.
We shall be concerned here with the implications, for the growth in per
capita income and for the provision of productive employment, of alter-
native possible future courses of fertility. The specific alternatives to be
considered are the maintenance of fertility at its current level and, as the
contrasting alternative, a rapid reduction in fertifity, amounting to fifty
per cent of the initial level and occupying a transitional period of about
twenty-five years. [Coale, 1969, p. 63.]
After generating the two alternative projections or "scenarios," Coale
went on to examine what effects these contrasting fertility trends
would have on three important population characteristics:
First, the burden of dependency, defined as the total number of per-
sons in the population divided by the number in the labor force ages [fif-
teen to sixty-four]; second the rate of growth of the labor force, or, more
precisely, the annual per cent rate of increase of the population fifteen to
sixty-four; and third, the density of the population, or, more precisely,
the number of persons at labor force age relative to land area and other
resources. Then we shall consider how these three characteristics of
dependency, rate of growth, and density influence the increase in per
capita income. [Coale, 1969, p. 63.]
In this section we shall adopt Coale's scenario-building approach to
focus on some of the demoeconomic consequences of rapid urbaniza-
tion. Because this requires a view of urban and rural regions with in-
teracting populations, we cannot ignore the impact of migration. We
begin by describing the construction and evolution of four alternative
population scenarios and then go on to examine the implications that
these alternative trends in migration and fertility would have on
:loser examination
ion (10.1) readily





7, we find that:
(10.6)176Alternatives for Growth Migr
Coale's three important population characteristics: the dependency
burden, the growth rate of labor force "eligibles," and the density of
the population.
The Dynamics of Urbanization: Four Scenarios
Multiregional population projections translate assumptions about
future trends in mortality, fertility, and migration with respect to a
specific initial population into numerical estimates of the future size,
age composition, and spatial distribution of that population. Tables
10-8 and 10-9 present several such illustrative projections. As in the
Coale paper, a hypothetical initial population of one million persons
with an age composition and fertility-mortality rates typical of a Latin
American country is projected one hundred and fifty years into the
future. To his two alternative projections (A—Fertility unchanged;
and B—Fertility reduced), however, we have added two others by vary-
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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 150
Urban 0-14 89 174 356 6671,1611,9402,95875,126
15-64104 193 375 7101,2702,1283,29385,388
65+ 7 9 14 24 44 84 157 5,146
Total200 376 7451,4022,4754,1526,408165,661
Rural 0-14394 482 617 751 8861,0341,331 46,645
15-64378 508 622 750 8961,0461,325 45,280







20 30 40 50 60 150
Urban 0-14 89 150 226 334 475 625 738 1,982
15-64104 193 368 630 9541,3181,633 4,487
65+ 7 9 14 24 44 84 157 709
Total200 352 607 9881,4732,0282,529 7,178
Rural 0-14394 435 452 409 368 340 334 1,216
15-64378 508 610 675 694 664 668 2,330
65+ 29 28 37 53 71 84 108 338
Total800 9711,0991,1381,1331,0881,109 3,884
aColumn values do not always sum exactly to given totals because of independent rounding.
ing our assumptions about internal migration (a—Migration unchang-
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deathrate of 14 per 1,000, giving rise to a population growing at 3 per-
cent per year. Starting with an expectation of life at birth of approx-
imately 53 years, he assumes that during the next 30 years it will rise
to about 70 years, at which point no further improvement will occur.
In Coale's Projection A, current age-specific rates of childbearing are
fixed for 150 years; in Projection B they are reduced by 2 percent each
year for 25 years (reducing fertility to half of its initial level), at which
point they too are fixed for the remainder of the projection period.
For our four urbanization scenarios we have spatially clisaggregated
Coale's data and assumptions in the following manner. Twenty per-
cent of the initial population of a million persons is taken to be urban.
The initial values for birth and death rates are assumed to be lower in
urban areas than in rural areas (40 against 45 per thousand for the
birth rate, and 11 against 15 per thousand for the death rate). Mortali-
ty and fertility are reduced as in the Coale projections, but the declines
are accomplished ten years sooner in urban areas (25 instead of 35 years
for the decline in mortality, and 20 instead of 30 years for the decline in
fertility).
A multiregional population projection also requires a specification
of the initial values and future course of internal migration (see
Rogers, 1975). To generate the four scenarios, initial rates of outmigra-
tion were set equal to those prevailing in India in 1960 (Bose, 1973);
that is, a crude outmigration rate from urban areas of 10 per thousand
and a corresponding rate from rural areas of 7 per thousand. The age-
specific rates of outmigration from urban areas are held fixed in all
four projections, as are the corresponding rates from rural areas in the
two a projections. Outmigration from rural areas in the two b projec-
tions, however, is assumed to increase sixfold over a period of 50 years,
and then to drop to a half of its peak value over the following 30 years,
after which it is held unchanged for the remaining 70 years of the pro-
jection period (Figure 10-14).
Table 10-10liststhe principal parametric assumptions that
generated Coale's two illustrative projections and contrasts them with
those that produced the four scenarios summarized in Tables 10.8 and
10-9. The assumptions appear to be reasonable in that the hypothetical
urbanization paths charted by them are plausible. For example, the
percentage-urban paths for the b projections in Figure 10-15 resemble
the general shape of the observed urbanization paths set out earlier in
Figure 10-11, and Figure 10-16 shows that the trajectories of urban
and rural growth rates for these projections are in general similar to
those exhibited by the U.S. data graphed in Figure 10-13.
As in Coal's scenarios, the initial population and the future regime
of mortality are the same for all of the four population projections
summarized in Tables 10-8 and 10-9. The major impact of the drop in
Figure 1O-1
fertilityappears I
about 24 times a
Migration's imp
spatial distributi









these rates to 0.
1975, p. 10).
The dynamics 1
are reflected in T
tion Bb in greate
In growing at3 per-
at birth of approx-
30 yearS it will rise
vement will occur.
of childbearing are
1 by 2 percent each




taken to be urban.
med to be lower in
thousand for the
ath rate). Mortali-
is, but the declines
instead of 35 years





of 10 per thousand
housand. The age-
'e held fixed in all
i rural areas in the
i the two b projec-
period of 50 years,
following 30 years,
0 years of the pro-
tssumptions that
ntrasts them with










wet of the drop in





















20 40 60 80 100 120 140
YEAR
Figure 10-14.Migration Rates: Alternative Mobility Transitions
fertilityappears in the projected totals: the A projection totals are
about 24 times as large as the B projection totals after 150 years.
Migration's impact, on the other hand, appears principally in the
spatial distribution of these totals: the a projections allocate approx-
imately a third of the national population to urban areas after 150
years, whereas the b projections double this share.
Recently published statistics show population declines in the larger
metropolitan regions of many major industrialized nations (Vimng and
Kontuly, 1977). In the United States, for example, net migration into
metropolitan areas has been negative since the early 1970s. Thus,
whereas the average annual growth rate of metropolitan populations
exceeded the nonmetropolitan rate by 1.6 percent to 0.4 percent in the
1960s, a reversal occurred between 1970 and 1973 which transformed
these rates to 0.9 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively (Morrison,
1975, p. 10).
The dynamics leading to the decline of metropolitan rates of growth
are reflected in Table 10-11, which describes the evolution of Projec-
tion Bb in greater detail. Note that the rural growth rate declines and
•1180Alternatives for Growth




Population 1,000,000 200,000 800,000
Death Rate 14/1,000 11/1,000 15/1,000
Birth Rate 44/1,000 40/1,000 45/1,000
Outmigration Rate — 10/1,000 7/1,000
Future Paths
Mortality Decline over
30 years to level
with an expect-
tion of life at
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even takes on negative values for a 15-year period, then increases
gradually and ultimately overtakes the urban growth rate. Observe
that this does not occur at the intervals in which net migration to ur-
ban areas is negative.
Demoeconomic Consequences of Growth
and Urbanization
Figure 10-17 shows that the three population characteristics ex-
amined by Coale vary in their relative significance in the short,
medium, and long runs, respectively. Changes in age compositions ap-
pear as changes in the dependency burden during the first 30 years and
constitute the first principal impact of reduced fertility. After the first
generation, however, the etablished difference in dependency burdens
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Urban and Rural Growth Rates: Four Alternate Scenarios
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Component Rates of Change
(per thousand)




Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
0 29.00 30.00 18.00 —4.50 47.00 25.50 20.00 80.00
5 28.47 29.76 24.81 —7.36 53.28 22.40 22.89 77.11
10 26.52 29.56 28.47 —10.32 54.99 19.24 26.61 73.39
15 23.86 28196 29.49 —13.21 53.35 15.75 30.94 69.06
20 20.35 26.92 28.17 —15.56 48.52 11.36 35.58 64.42
25 21.56 23.84 24.76 —17.14 46.32 6.70 40.91 59.09
30 21.10 20.20 20.98 —18.22 42.09 1.98 46.48 53.52
35 20.20 20.40 18.11 —19.34 38.31 1.05 51.65 48.35
40 19.12 19.12 15.44 —20.08 34.57 —0.96 56.53 43.47
45 17.95 17.38 12.84 —20.10 30.79 —2.72 61.02 38.98
50 16.78 15.66 10.50 —19.57 27.28 —3.91 65.08 34.92
55 15.52 14.69 6.81 —14.32 22.33 0.37 67.77 32.23
60 14.43 14.41 4.41 —10.04 18.84 4.37 69.50 30.50
65 13.40 14.26 2.69 —6.43 16.09 7.83 70.47 29.53
70 12.37 14.22 1.40 —3.40 13.77 10.82 70.83 29.17
75 11.43 14.52 0.36 —0.87 11.80 13.65 70.67 29.33
80 10.71 15.19 —0.53 1,25 10.17 16.44 70.05 29.95
85 10.24 15.65 —0.22 0.51 10.01 16.15 69.41 30.59
90 9.92 15.92 0.05 —0.11 9.97 15.81 68.79 31.21
95 9.78 16.13 0.30 —0.64 10.08 15.49 68.20 31.80
100 9.81 16.29 0.52 —1.09 10.33 15.20 67.65 32.35
105 9.81 16.29 0.72 —1.47 10.53 14.82 67.15 32.85
110 9.87 16.21 0.88 —1.77 10.76 14.44 66.71 33.29
115 9.81 15.97 1.02 —2.01 10.83 13.96 66.33 33.67
120 9.86 15.84 1.14 —2.21 11.01 13.63 66.00 34.00
125 9.97 15.78 1.24 —2.39 11.21 13.39 65.73 34.27
130 10.07 15.75 1.33 —2.53 11.40 13.22 65.50 34.50
135 10.14 15.72 1.41 —2.65 11.54 13.07 65.30 34.70
140 10.16 15.68 1.47 —2.75 11.63 12.94 65.14 34.86
145 10.17 15.64 1.52 —2.83 11.70 12.81 65.01 34.99
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tion between the annual growth rates of labor-force agegroups begins
to appear after 15 years, and widens to a maximum difference in about
70 years, that is, 45 years after fertility stabilizes at its reduced value.
Once established, this difference continues essentially unchanged
forever after in the two scenarios. Finally, the long-run effect of re-
duced fertility starts to become significant after 70 years; at this point
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Source:Coale (1969), p. 66.
Figure10-17.Dependency Burden, Annual Rate of Increase arid Relative Size
of Population Aged 15-64 Years: Two Alternative Projections.
thetwo alternative projections assume essentially fixed differences in
age compositions and in rates of growth, and vary primarily in their
relative sizes. This variation assumes enormous dimensions after 150
years, when the total size of the population in the 15 to 64 year age
bracket in the population with constant fertility is about 18 times
larger than the corresponding number in the population with reduced
fertility.
The process of national modernization and development depends in
a very direct way on the capacity of a national economy to increase its
level of net investment. Recognizing that this is only a necessary and
not a sufficient condition, Coale argues that the low fertility popula-
tion is in a better position to divert resources away from production for
current consumption to net investment aimed at the enhancement of
future productivity.
The two projected populations in the labor-force agegroups in
I1
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Figure10-17 differ by only 4 percent after 25 years. It is not
unreasonable, therefore, to assume that national income is at that
point the same for the two scenarios. The pressure for allocating a
much higher proportion of the national product for consumption then
would be greater in the higher fertility population because of its higher -t—-r-.&
dependencyburden. Families with a large number of children, it is fre-
quently argued, save less than those with fewer children, and the
capacity of their governments and economies to raise the level of net
investment, therefore, will be seriously impaired.
The short-run depressing influence of high dependency on savings
and investment is exacerbated in the middle run by a high growth rate
of the labor-force population. A larger labor force requires a larger
capital stock to achieve the same productivity per capita. Adopting as
a rule of thumb a capital-output ratio of 3, Coale concludes that with
net investment growing at the respectable rate of 15 percent of na-
tional income, a "population with a rate of growth of three percent in
its labor force can, with such a level of investment, add about two per-
cent per year to the endowment of capital per worker" (Coale, 1969, pp.
_____
70-71). It therefore will be able to add less to the productive capacity of
the economy than a population experiencing a less rapid rate of labor-
force growth. Thus, reduced fertility not only generates, in the short
run, a population with fewer consumers among whom to divide a given
output, it also helps, in the middle run, to generate a larger national
output to divide.
Finally, the concern with excessive density of people to available
________
resources—thatis, with "overpopulation"—stems from the belief that
per capita output declines above some ratio of workers to resources. It
is argued that at some point an excessively large population produces
a depressing effect on per capita output.
As Coale points out, however, the usefulness of the density concept
in diagnosing population problems of less developed countries is 0
limited.Politically feasible and realistic policies to influence the size of
a national population are largely limited to fertility control, and such
policies can affect the relative density of the labor force to resources
only in the long run, that is, after changes in dependency and labor-
force growth rates have already produced their major economic ef-
fects. Also, density is relevant primarily in economies that do not par-
ticipate in international trade or that are principally organized around
extractive activities such as mining, agriculture, and forestry. ——a -
Theprincipal demographic impacts of reduced fertility described
above are not altered substantially by the introduction of migration as
a component of change and the concomitant spatial subdivision of the
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10-19show that for a given regime of migration (a or b), the major im-
pacts of reduced fertility are, as in the Coale model, a decline in the
burden of dependency in the short run, alowering of the growth rate of
the labor-force population in the medium run, and a very much smaller
_______
densityof people to resources in the long run. The spatial model does,
however, bring into sharp focus urban-rural differentials: (1) differen-
tials in dependency burdens and in the relative magnitudes of their
decline following fertility reduction; and (2) differentials in initial
growth rates of the labor-force population and the paths of their
gradual convergence in the long run.
The dependency ratio in urban areas is 19 points lower than its rural
counterpart at the start of the projection period. With constant fertili- -
ty,the regional dependency burdens remain essentially unchanged.
Declining fertility, however, narrows these differentials to almost a -.J
thirdof their original values, as the urban drop of 33 points is matched
by a corresponding decline of 45 points in rural areas.
The annual growth rates of the labor-force population in urban and
rural areas initially are 0.05 and 0.03, respectively. For both migration
regimes, however, they converge to approximately the same values in
the long run: 0.04 in the constant fertility scenario and slightly above
0.01 in the reduced fertility projection.
The major demographic impacts of increased rural-urban migration
for a given regime of fertility are set out in Figures 10-20 and 10-21, in
which are graphed the a and b projections for each of the two fertility
_________
regimes:fixed and reduced. These diagrams show that the influence of
migration patterns in our particular scenarios is negligible with
respect to dependency burdens, and is of paramount importance, in the
short and medium runs, with regard to the growth rate of the popula-
tion aged 15 to 64. In the long run, migration also has a moderately
powerful impact on the density of workers to resources in rural areas.
Perhaps the most interesting observation suggested by Figures
10-20 and 10-2 1 is the transitory nature of high rates of urban growth.
In the b projections, urban growth rates in excess of 6 percent per an-
num occur only in the short run, as the national population experiences Z
itsearly phases of urbanization. This sudden spurt of growth of urban
areas in the short run declines over the medium run, and in the long
run it levels off at a rate below that generated by the fixed migration
regime. The growth curve of rural areas, of course, assumes a path that
______
reversesthis trajectory, with the growth of the rural working popula-
tion declining to relatively low—even negative—levels before increas-
ing to stabilize at about the same level as that prevailing in the urban
population.
Increased migration into cities reduces the size of rural populations
kor b), the major im-
el, a decline in the
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etJ Alternatives for Growth
andhence their density with respect to rural resources such as
agricultural land. Figures 10-20 and 10-21 show that the relative size
of the rural population aged 15 to 64 is over 2.5 times larger under the
fixed migration schedules of projections a than under the increased
rural-urban migration rates of projections b. Thus the b scenarios
create rapid urban growth and exacerbate human settlement pro-
blems, but at the same time reduce the density of rural populations to
land and other rural resources. The a scenarios, on the other hand, give
urban areas more time to cope with growth, but do so at the cost of in-
creasing rural population densities. "Hyperurbanization" and "rural
overpopulation," therefore, are the two sides of the fundamental policy
question regarding development.
The economic implications of the spatio-ternporal behavior of
dependency, growth, and density in the urbanization scenarios are
much the same as those described by Coale (1969), but they now in-
clude a spatial dimension. First, it is commonly believed that urban
households save a largerfraction of their income than rural
households. Thus the rapid urbanization arising out of increased rural-
urban migration could have a positive impact on the national savings
rate. But increased rural-urban migration creates rapid urban growth,
thereby reducing the per capita endowment of capital and infrastruc-
ture in cities and contributing to high rates of unemployment in ex-
ploding urban centers. Finally, rapid urban growth in less developed
countries tends to be concentrated in a few very large cities, and "city
bigness" is viewed by many as a negative feature of development. The
argument is that urban agglomerations become inefficient once they
pass a certain size threshold, and thereafter the social costs of further
growth begin to exceed the corresponding social benefits. However,
several economists have maintained that large urban agglomerations
generate more benefits than costs and that efforts to retard their
growth, therefore, are likely to reduce national economic growth rates
(for example, Gilbert, 1976).
Until recently, research on the economic influences of rural-urban
migration in less developed countries has been largely ignored by na-
tional economic planners who have tended to emphasize "traditional
economic variables such as output growth rates, terms of trade, sav-
ings and investment, and relative efficiency."
The efficient allocation of human resources between sectors, if discussed
at all, has been assumed to be a natural out-growth of a self-adjusting
mechanism which functioned to equate sectoral marginal productivities.
Rural-urban migration was portrayed as a manifestation of this self-
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and,as such, was not deemed to be of sufficient intrinsic importance to
warrant detailed theoretical and empirical investigation. [Todaro, 1975,
p.367.]
Growing levels of urban unemployment and underemployment in
less developed countries have sharply underlined the danger of ignor-
ing the impacts of migration on development, and have exposed to
question the applicability, of the traditional economic models as
descriptors of the practical socioeconomic realities of today's less
developed world. The determinants and consequences of rural-urban
migration and the relationships between such migration and the
economic development of urban and rural areas are currently subjects
of utmost importance and warrant careful scholarly examination.
Agreement on this seems to be widely shared. What is less evident is
the conceptual framework one could profitably adopt in such an
endeavor. Can the Coale-Hoover (1958) paradigm and its successors,
which have served as an economic framework for examining the pro-
bable consequnces of a drastic decline in the fertility rates of low-
income countries such as India, be generalized and extended to serve
as a framework for examining the probable consequences of significant
increases in rural-urban migration levels and urbanization rates of
such countries?
Migration and Development
In developed countries, high levels of urbanization and high rates of
urban growth have historically been associated with high and increas-
ing levels of per capita income. Figure 10-22, for example, indicates
that the higher the percentage of a national population that is urban,
the higher is the national per capita gross national product (GNP).
This positive association is generally attributed to factors such as
rapid industrialization, increases in productivity, widespread literacy,
improved nutrition, and advances in health services.
Figure 10-23 illustrates that it is important to distinguish the ef-
fects of high levels of urbanization from those of high rates of urban
population growth. The positive relationship between per capita GNP
and urbanization level is difficult to discern in the plot of urban growth
rates and per capita GNP growth rates that appear there. Indeed there
seems to be a lack of any association whatsoever. We conclude,
therefore, that although high proportions of national populations in ur-
ban areas are conditions that appear to be positively associated with
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Figure10-22.Degreeofurbanization Compared with GNP per capita, 1973.
Mostnations of the developing world are currently less urbanized
than the developed countries, but are urbanizing more rapidly. With a
few notable exceptions, their per capita income is growing slowly
relative to their population increase, and their development is much
too complex to be studied with the aid of simple plots such as those
found in Figures 10-22 and 10-23. A fuller understanding of the impor-
tant relationships that are hidden in these graphs requires the
specification and estimation of a model that interconnects the prin-
cipal contributing sectors of demoeconomic growth.
Figure10-24setsout the underlying structureof such a
macrodemoeconomic model. Here changes in population are allowed to
influence the level of output directly, and the contribution of natural
resources (such as land) can be included in the same aggregate produc-
tion function. Ideally the demoeconomic growth model should disag-
gregate population into urban and rural components and distinguish
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Source: United Nations (34) (1976), p.28.
P per capita, 1973.
Figure 10-23.Comparison of Annual Average Percentage Rates of Growth of
Urban Population and Annual Percentage Rates of Growth in GNP per Capita,
1965-1973.
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Dualistic Models of Demoeconomic Growth
A large number of studies have concluded that migration usually is
a response to economic differentials and that the individual migrant
generally improves his or her well-being by moving. The net benefits of
this move to society, however, are much more difficult to determine.
Since the relationships between migration and development are
multidimensional and complex, evaluations of their interaction and
theirsocietal impactscallforageneral equilibrium systems
framework.
Migration between rural and urban areas changes population and
labor-force growth in both regions. It also changes savings-investment
behavior and the growth of capital stock. It alters labor-force produc-
tivity, and both affects and is affected by rural-urban income differen-
tials. A focus on the behavior of only one of these aspects while holding
the others unchanged can lead to erroneous policy conclusions.
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capturedwith a model framework that explicitly incorporates relatici
ships between demographic and economic change. But progress in the
development of such macroeconomic models has been slow, with the
result that we have not advanced much beyond the pioneering
framework provided by Coale and Hoover two decadesago.
3 Nonetheless, the outlines of a profitable and robust paradigm are
emerging out of the experiences of studies that have tried to exploit
the natural intersection within economics of dualistic growth theory,
general equilibrium analysis, and quantitative economic history. The
utility of such dualistic models of modern economic growth can be
defended with an argument based not solely on their usefulness "as
2 abstract analytical constructs, but rather on their usefulness as quan-
titative tools for interpreting the historical experience of developing
•countries" (Kelley and Williamson, 1973, p. 450).
Dualistic models of modern economic growth typically divide a low-
income economy into an agricultural-rural sector, which produces a
single consumption good, and an industrial-urban sector whose output
is divided between consumption and investment. Both sectors employ
labor and capital to produce their outputs; the agricultural sector, in
addition, utilizes land. Cobb-Douglas production functions are normal-
iy adopted for the agricultural sector, and CES production functions
are often assumed for the industrial sector. Technological change is
specified differentially to capture dualism in production, and urban
and rural residents are assumed to differ in their consumption and say-
ings behavior. Growth of the labor force is given exogenously, in most
instances, whereas the growth of the capital stock is determined en-
dogenously by means of a savings-investment equation.
Several future directions for dualistic model development were sug-
gested by Kelley (1973) in a recent review of the role of population in
models of modern economic growth. Heading the list of revisions of
the "standard" model was the desirability of endogenizing population
IZ growth:
Models in which population is endogenous are particularly relevant for
two specificpolicy-oriented reasons.First,ifpopulation growth
3 responds to economic conditions, then typical theoretical and empirical
estimates of population's impact will be biased. For example, if popula-
tion growth exerts a negative impact on the level and the pace of
economic progress, and if family size varies inversely with economic con-
ditions, then population growth will decline in response to its own
hypothesized negative impact on the economy. Its net adverse impact on
growth will therefore be quantitatively less than in the case where
population growth is assumed to be exogenously given.... Second, if
population growth is endogenous and sensitive to the variables used to196Alternatives for Growth Migrati
assessitsimpact—pollution,economic growth,socialstability,
employment—then policy recommendations should be formulated in a
framework analyzing population's net impact. The relevant research
issues include the speed of adjustment of population growth to policy ob-
jectives—and the extent to which the adjustment level is in some sense
"appropriate." [Kelley, 1973, p. 40.1
We shall refer to such models as dualistic models of demoeconomic
growth.
Kelley also emphasizes the importance of sectoral disaggregation.
He argues that because the rate of economic development is associated
with the rate of structural change, along such dimensions as degrees of
industrialization and urbanization, models used for policy purposes
should incorporate sectoral disaggregations. S.ich disaggregations
should include, for example, the impact of population growth on the
composition of demand as between urban and rural goods and the
response of population growth to the rate of structural economic
change when urban areas are assumed to foster a lower family size
than is found in rural areas. The latter has already received some at-
tention in the preceding section of this paper; the former will be ex-
amined in the next section. Here we shall return to our discussion of
dualistic models of demoeconomic growth and closely examine a recent
prototype of such a model in which the most important endogenous
population variable is internal migration.
A Prototype Model of Migration and Development
Population's role in models of economic growth has been substan-
tially enlarged in recent years. Most of the well-known models
developed thus far have focused on impacts of population growth on
per capita output (or income). Only a few models have also taken into
account the influences of economic variables on population growth.
Fewer yet have included internal migration as an endogenous variable
affecting growth and development.
A prototype model of macrodemoeconomic growth should sketch
out the main relationships determining the demographic and economic
evolution of a nation experiencing modernization and development. It
should contribute to the understanding of population's principal im-
pacts on socioeconomic change and of the consequences of such change
on demographic growth and distribution. In order to deal with ques-
tions of urbanization, such a model should distinguish between
agricultural and nonagricultural production sectors and between rural
and urban populations. Differential patterns of fertility, mortality,
and internal migration should be incorporated explicitly, the govern-
ment policy variables should constitute an important part of the
model.
Instead of reviewin
in general satisfy the
model that resemble
below was developed
and is described in gr
growing class of dual
to an improved unde
urban migration in d
Yap presents a
growth, with interná
variable that both mt
in economic well-beii




ticular, there are h
technological chang
tional urban secton
rural than for the ur
sities for urban wor
workers, than for th
generates pressures
well as for higher p
rural areas. With th
rural to urban are
capital in the two
growth potential of
The Yap model w
simulation techthq
migration on the gr
fif teen-year period.
of the Brazilian eco
internal migration.
and simulations us
were assumed to re
tion of the growth
Table 10-12 sets
Run Ri is the hist
Runs R2 and R3 a
3Several reviews and
Among the best are tho
and McNicoIi (1975).th,socialstability,
Id be formulated in a
1he relevant research
n growth to policy ob-




ensions as degrees of
I for policy purposes
;uch disaggregations
ilation growth on the
rural goods and the
structural economic
r a lower family size
Ldy received some at-
he former will be cx-
to our discussion of
sely examine a recent
iportant endogenous
nent
h has been substan-
well-known models
opulation growth on







mceg of such change
:r to deal with ques-
istinguish between
s and between rural
fertility, mortality,
ilicitly, the govern-
ortant part of the
1
Migration, Urbanization, Resources, & Development197
Instead of reviewing the several existing demoeconomic models that
in general satisfy these criteria, we shall describe a single prototype
model that resembles and draws on the others.3 The model outlined
below was developed by Lorene Yap as part of a doctoral dissertation
and is described in greater detail in Yap (1976). It is representative of a
growing class of dualistic demoeconomic models that could contribute
to an improved understanding of the societal consequences of rural-
urban migration in developing countries.
Yap presents a three-sector neoclassical model of rural-urban
growth, with internal migration explicitly specified as an endogenous
variable that both influences and is influenced by regional differentials
in economic well-being. The model describes a disequilibrium process
of growth in which firms maximize profits and individuals maximize
utility. Migration between urban and rural sectors is viewed as a
means of equalizing factor returns.
Rural-urban sectoral differences are emphasized in the model. In par-
ticular, there are higher capital and labor productivity and rates of
technological change in the modern urban than in the rural and tradi-
tional urban sectors; higher rates of natural population growth for the
rural than for the urban population; and higher marginal savings propen-
sities for urban workers and businesses, and higher tax rates for urban
workers, than for their rural counterparts. Urban population growth also
generates pressures for more urban investment by the government, as
well as for higher per capita public service expenditures in urban than in
rural areas. With these sectoral differences a transfer of population from
rural to urban areas will change the productivity of both labor and
capital in the two areas, the growth of both factors, and therefore, the
growth potential of the sectors. [Yap, 1976, p. 122.]
The Yap model was estimated using 1950-1965 data for Brazil, and
simulation techniques were used to assess the impact of rural-urban
migration on the growth of the Brazilian national product during that
fifteen-year period. A historical growth path and two alternative paths
of the Brazilian economy were simulated, each with different rates of
internal migration. The differences between the historical simulation
and simulations using a lower migration flow than the historical one
were assumed to reflect the importance of migration in the determina-
tion of the growth rate of GNP during the period 1950 to 1965.
Table 10-12 sets out the principal results of Yap's three simulations.
Run Ri is the historical simulation with observed migration levels.
Runs R2 and R3 are the two "counterfactual" simulations: the first
3Severai reviews and assessments of demoeconomic modeling have been published.
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Table 10-12.Simulation Runs with Alternative Migration Levels
1.
Run R2
Run RI (migration Run R3
(actual parameters (migration
migration reduced parameters
level) by 0.5) set to zero)
A verage .4 verage A verage
Growth Growth Growth
RateInitialFinalRate FinalRate Final
Variables (%) Year Year (%) Year (%) Year
1. Migration as proportion
ofurbanpopulation 0.030.02 0.02 0
2. Urban population (mill.) 5.1 17.537.3 4.1 32.0 2.4 25.0
a. Proportion of total
population 0.350.47 0.39 0.31
3.Inconse per capita ($) 2.7 300 441 2.4 418 1.9 391
a. Rural 1.5 162 200 1.3 193 1.0 186
b. Urban 1.9 557 716 2.2 759 3.0 852
4. Income or value added 5.9 15.035.2 5.6 33.6 5.2 31.7
($biIl.)
a. Agriculture 3.3 5.3 8.4 3.9 9.3 4.7 10.4
b. Modern 7.1 9.225.6 6.5 23.4 5.7 20.9
c. Traditional 4.9 0.5 1.2 2.9 0.9 —2.1 0.4
5. Capitalstock ($bill.) 5.4 37.0 79.5 5.2 77.5 4.9 75.)
a. Agriculture 3.3 13.1 21.1 3.4 21.5 3.6 22.0
b.Modern sector 6.3 23.958.4 6.0 56.0 5.6 53.1
6. Sectoral employment as
proportion of total
employment
a. Agriculture 1.8 0.650.53 2,7 0.60 3.7 0.69
b,Modern 5.2 0.26 0.35 4.5 0.3) 3.5 0.27
(I) skilled 5.5 0.100.15 4.6 0.12 3.3 0.10
(2) unskilled 5.0 0.160.20 4.4 0.19 3.6 0.17
•c. Traditional 4.9 0.090.12 2.9 0.09 —2.1 0.04
7. Wage dit'ferentials
a. Rural-urban 0.370.36 0.33 0.29
b. Rural-urban:
Unskilled only 0.590.57 0.53 0.47
c. Urban unskilled-
urban skilled 0.330.35 0.34 0.34
8. Sectoral wage inequality 3.434.34 4.63 6.93
Source: Yap (38)(1976), pp. 133-34.-'l

















































assumed that migration was half as sensitive to regional wage dif-
ferentials as it actually was; the second assumed that migration did
not occur at all.
An examination of the major economic consequences of the two
counterfactual experiments reveals four significant impacts occasion-
ed by the reduction in rural-urban migration:
1.Reducing migration reduces the growth rates of total and per
capita GNP.
2.Reducing migration increases agriculture's share of total output.
3.Reducing migration reduces the accumulation of capacity for
future growth.
4.Reducing migration increases sectoral inequalities.
Yap's simulations indicate that migration made a positive contribu-
tion to Brazil's postwar development. A 50 percent reduction in the
values taken on by the parameters of the migration function lowers the
average annual growth rate of GNP from 5.9 to 5.6 percent. A further
drop to 5.2 percent follows from a complete prohibition of migration. A
similar decline occurs in per capita terms, with the annual per capita
GNP growth rate declining from 2.7to2.4 and 1.9 percent,
respectively.
A reduction in rural-urban migration increases the growth of
agricultural output from 3.3 to 3.9 percent annually, as migration's
sensitivity to wage differentials is reduced to half of its previous level,
and to 4.7 percent annually as migration drops to zero. At the same
time the annual growth rate of the modern sector's output decreases
from 7.1 to 6.5 to 5.7 percent, respectively. The output of the trad.i-
tional sector also declines, and actually contracts at the rate of —2.1
percent per year in the run with zero migration.
A reduction in migration lowers the capacity for future growth, ac-
cording to the counterfactual simulations reported in Table 10-12.
Growth capacity, measured in terms' of physical and human capital
stocks, declines with reduced migration. Terminal stocks of physical
and human capital (the latter measured by the fraction of skilled
workers)—which are $79.5 billion and 15 percent, respectively, in the
historical simulation—drop to $77.5 and $75.1 billion and to 12 and 10
percent, respectively, in the two counterfactual simulations with
lowered migration levels.
Finally, the counterfactual simulations indicate that migration con-200Alternatives for Growth
tributespositively to a reduction in the growing inequality between
the urban and rural sectors. Yap's model shows that the extent of
wage inequality in the labor force and the differential in per capita in-
come between sectors both increase when rural-urban migration is
reduced below its historical level. More wage inequality and a larger
differential in per capita income are reported in Table 10-12 for the
final year of the two counterfactuals than for the historical simulation.
The principal results of the prototype model of migration and
development described above add further weight to arguments
directed against major efforts to curb rural-to-urban migration in the
less developed world. The powerful private incentives and the ap-
parently substantial social gains associated with such migration are
apt to make policies to restrict rural-urban migration very costly. Ur-
banization policies in the less developed nations, therefore, are likely
to be more socially beneficial if their focus is on managing rapid urban
growth and reducing urban poverty rather than curtailing the flow of
migrants to cities. Such a policy perspective leads naturally to an in-
terest in the resource and service demands of rapid urbanization.
RESOURCE AND SERVICE DEMANDS OF A
RAPIDLY URBANIZING POPULATION
What are the resource and service demands of urbanization likely to be
during the next 30 to 50 years in the less developed nations of the
world? How important will urban population growth be relative to ur-
ban economic growth as a generator of increased levels of demand? To
what extent would the management problems associated with meeting
these demands be eased if urbanization rates were significantly
reduced? These and related questions are receiving increasing atten-
tion as part of a general concern over whether population increase will
ultimately outstrip the growth in food supplies and exhaust the
world's stock of natural resources.
Resources and services are demanded by people; hence, if all else is
fixed, the level of demand should be approximately proportional to
population size. Demand above this level may be attributed to af-
fluence. For example, Keyfitz (1976) calculates that U.S. energy con-
sumption would have risen from its 1947 level of 1.21 biffion tons of
coal equivalent to 1.77 billion tons in 1973 if it merely kept pace with
population increase. The fact that energy consumption rose beyond
that total to 2.55 billion tons in 1973 was due to affluence, according to
Keyfitz. Thus of the total increment of 1.34 billion tons, 0.56 billion
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The association between energy consumption and affluence is more
explicitly shown in Figure 10-26, which plots per capita energy con-
sumption against per capita income for 96 nations of the world. The
correlation is striking and it reflects the fact that as a poor country
develops, it requires a larger throughput of energy resources to run its
economy and supply the needs of its population.
The relationships between demoeconomic change and patterns of
resource and service demand are imperfectly understood. The
demographic and economic determinants of the level and composition
of demand are several, but a satisfactory first approximation may be
obtained by considering only the impacts of changes in the size of a
given population and in the total income that is at its disposal.
If relative prices and tastes remain stable, then the demand for a
given commodity or service may be shown to grow approximately at a
rate equal to the sum of: (1) the income demand elasticity times the
growth rate of per capita real income; and (2) the population demand
elasticity times the rate of population growth (Kaneda, 1968, p. 6):
D_P Y DP 1Y (10.11)
where D denotes demand, Y is real income, P is population, a is the
elasticity of demand with respect to income,is the elasticity of de-
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Figure 10-26.Per Capita-Energy Use and GNP, 1965
derivatives (that is, changes in the value of the variable over time).5 If,
in addition, the postulated demand function is homogeneous of degree
one; that is, if there are no scale economies of demand, then=1—a
and (10.11k simplifies to:
ii,i'
DP P
5Elasticities of demand measure the percentage change in demand generated by a
unit percentage change in a variable thought to be influencing the level of that demand.
For example, if an additional dollar of income raises the demand for food by 50 cents,
we say that the income elasticity of demand for food is 0.5
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•• 1
Equation(10.12) may be used to infer the income elasticity of de-
mand for food from data on income, population, and agricultural pro-
.• duction. For example, taking as given a 1 percent annual population
$ growthrate, a 3.8 percent rate of growth of per capita income per year,
and a 1.6 percent annual growth rate of rice available for consumption,
Kaneda used Equation (10.12) to infer that the income elasticity of de-
mand for rice in Japan must have been a =0.21(Kaneda, 1968, p. 7).
Thus, approximately half of the observed percentage increase in the
amount of rice demanded was due to growth in per capita income, and
the ether half was attributable to population increase.
The Influence of Spatial Distribution:
The Demand for Food
Patterns of food consumption undergo considerable change during
the process of a country's urbanization and development. Two fun-
damental shifts are: (1) a decline in the fraction of total per capita in-
come that is spent on food (Engel's law); and (2) the change in the com-
position of the per capita food bundle. The share of food in private con-
sumption expenditures (the so-called Engel ratio) declines from levels
as high as 75 to 80 percent in traditional poor societies to levels less
than half of that in modern developed societies. The composition of the
per capita food bundle also changes, as consumers substitute "prefer-
red" food products, such as animal protein foods, for "inferior" food
products such as starchy staples.
Rapid urbanization has helped to shape new food consumption pat-
2000 3000 terns in developing nations. Electric kitchen appliances have expanded
the range and variety of methods for preparing food. Increasing af-
fluence in urban centers has led to a growing importation of exotic
foods and such essential food items as meat and dairy products.
GNP1965 Urbanization influences the level and composition of food consump-
tion in a number of related ways. First, urban and rural populations
typically have different consumption patterns. Thus a rapid change in
riable over time).5 If, the geographic distribution of a national population is bound to alter
mogeneous of degree the aggregate demand for food. Second, an important consequence of
iand, then =1—a rural-urban migration is a change in the pattern of income distribu-
tion, as migrants gradually improve their income status. This change
influences aggregate food consumption patterns; for example, an im-
(10.12) provement in the income level of lower income groups would be ex-
pected to increase aggregate food demand more rapidly than other-
d wise. Finally, changes in tastes induced by urban development pro-
the level of that dend cesses would be expected to further increase the aggregate elasticity of
rnd for food by 50 cents, food demand.
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tialreduction in urban and rural Engel ratios that has followed the
high growth rates of per capita income during the postwar years
(Figure 10-27). For each of the three years included in Figure 10-27, the
Engel ratio for urban households is lower than that for farm
households. This in part reflects the higher per capita income of urban
households. The fraction of total expenditure that is devoted to
starchy staples (cereals, potatoes, and so on) is also lower for the urban
population. As increasing income permits urban households to modify
their dietary habits, they tend to consume ever larger quantities of
animal protein foods such as meat, dairy products, eggs, and fish.
The differences in urban and rural food consumption patterns il-
lustrated in Figure 10-27 also may be observed in the recent estimates
of income elasticities developed by Kaneda (1968). These are set out in
Table 10-13 and reveal that, as in the case of Engel ratios, the
elasticities for all food, starchy staples, and animal proteins are
smaller for the urban population than for the rural (farm) population.
A possible explanation of this result is the greater variety and
availability of alternative goods in urban centers. As a consequence,
income expansion among farm households would increase aggregate
food consumption more than a similar growth in income among urban
households.
Sector-specific income elasticities such as those presented in Table
10-13 may be combined with urban and rural versions of Equation
(10.12) to yield crude estimates of food demand over time and space.
URBANHOUSEHOLDS FARM HOUSEHOLDS
48.8% — 48.1°il—







1953 1957 1961 1953 1957 1961
STARCHYSTAPLES
______
ANIMAL PROTEINS L 1 OTHER FOODS []
Source:Kaneda (1970) (16), p. 423.
Figure10-27.Percent of Total Household Expenditures Devoted to Specified
Food Groups by Urban and Farm Households in Japan
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Table 10-13.Measured Income Elasticities Based on Household Budget Surveys.
Urban Workers' Households, and Farm Households, 1953, 1957, and 1961
Year Totalfood Starchy staplesa Anim a! proteins1'



















































Source: Kaneda (16) (1968), p.22. Estimates were derived by weighted logarithmic
regressions; observations were weighted according to the number of households represented
in each group.
aCereals and starchy roots (such as potatoes) for farm households represented in each group.
bMeat, dairy products, eggs, and fish.
CFigures in parentheses are standard errors of estimate.
dNot significantly different from zero at 5 percent.
Assume, for example, that the income elasticity for starchy staples is
0.1 in urban areas and 0.4 in rural areas. Let the annual growth rates of
urban and rural incomes be 6.5 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively.
(The latter are roughly the values presented for Brazil in Table 10-12.)
Finally, assume that projection Bb in Table 10-11 describes the
demographic evolution of the population under study. Then, during
the initial years, demand for starchy staples in urban areas will be
growing at an annual rate of about:
=0.047+ 0.1(0.065 —0.047)=0.049
whereas the corresponding demand in rural areas will increase at the
annual rate of:
=0.025+ 0.4(0.033 —0.025)=0.028
If the only changes after fifty years are increases in the annual
growth rates of urban income to 10 percent and of rural income to 4
percent, then the growth rate of demand for starchy staples should
decline to 0.034 in urban areas and to 0.0 14 in rural areas. Since during
this period the urban share of the total national population increased
from 20 percent to 65 percent, the aggregate national demand for
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starchy staples should decline from an initial annual growth rate of
about 3.2 percent to one close to 2.7 percent. (If, as is likely, the income
elasticities decline with increasing income, then this reduction should
be, of course, even greater.)
Equations (10.11) and (10.12) provide crde approximations of de-
mand changes stimulated by population ad income growth in set-
tings where the assumption of stable tastes and relative prices is not
seriously violated. However, when food consumption patterns change
rapidly, as they did in postwar Japan, for example, then the impacts of
possible shifts in tastes and relative prices should be taken into ac-
count. Kaneda (1968) attempts to do this by adopting the following
generalization of Equation (10.11):
+ (10.13) DA 'PF
in which the intercept term is interpreted as a measure of changes in
the structure of demand defined by the parametersand a. Using
household budget data for Japan and relaxing the assumption that E
must equal 1 —a,he obtains the partial elasticities of food demand for
family income and also for family size. Table 10-14 presents his
estimated elasticities, and reveals the following two important points:
1.Urban and rural partial size elasticities for total food expenditures
do not differ nearly as much as partial income elasticities (0.405
against 0.455, for the former; and 0.462 against 0.555, for the lat-
ter). This suggests that differences in urban and rural household
consumption behavior may be attributed much more to differences
in income levels than to variations in family size.
2.The ranking of food groups in terms of partial income elasticities
is, in descending order of magnitude: animal proteins, other foods,
total food, and starchy staples. The corresponding ranking in
terms of partial size elasticities is essentially the reverse. The first
ordering reflects consumers' preferences; the second ranking
reflects the effects of family size on food consumption. For exam-
ple, animal proteins are preferred to starchy staples, but an in-
crease in family size makes its members relatively poorer and in-
creases the basic "need" for food energy. As family size for farm
households increases, their consumption of animal proteins is
reduced.
A widely observed regularity associated with urbanization, develop-
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Table 10-14.Estimated Elasticities with Respect to Family Size and Total
Expenditure, Postwar Years




































the corresponding rise in the importance of industrial production. The
conventional explanation for this regularity points to the declining im-
portance of food expenditures as income rises. But as Kelley (1969)
observes, Engel curve analysis—with its primary focus on expenditure
and income elasticities—can serve only as crude first approximation in
any assessment of the influence of aggregate demand on industrial
patterns: "Systematic changes in the rate of population growth, of
ages, of average family size, and of urbanization (internal migration)
are all part of economic development. ..eachof these factors exerts
an impact on the size and composition of demand.. ."(Kelley,1969, p.
111).
The Influence of Age Composition: Demand
for Personal Health Services
In discussing the determinants of the demand for health care, we
shall focus on personal health services only, that is, "those provided
for individuals by doctors, nurses, and health technicians. .. totreat
illness, prevent disease or disability, or facilitate such normal pro-
cesses as human reproduction" (Corsa and Oakley, 1971, p. 372). Thus
I annual growth rate of
as is likely, the income
ithis reduction should
Source: Kaneda (16) (1968), p. 24,
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors of estimate.
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weshall exclude from consideration societal environmental health ac-
tivities and such services as public information, education, vital
registration, and health surveillance.
Crude estimates of personal health-care demands may be obtained
by using appropriate service utilization ratios. Thus, for example, cur-
rent ratios of health personnel and facilities to population may be ap-
plied to alternative population projections to develop estimates of the
requirements for future health needs. However, as in the case of
energy consumption in Figure 10-25, greater demands for health per-
sonnel and facilities arise not only from a growing population but also
from an increasing level of income. Figure 10-28 indicates that this
relationship, which is very evident in the less developed countries, may
not persist in such a simple form once the countries reach a relatively
high level of development.
The spatial distribution of a population also needs to be taken into
account in studies of health-service requirements. Health-service
ratios in less developed countries, for example, are generally much
higher in the major cities than in the rest of the country (see, for exam-
ple, Table 10-15). As a result, most developing countries are striving to
narrow the gap that exists between urban and rural areas in the I- I
availabilityof health services, so current rural service ratios are made-
quate norms with which to scale levels of future health-care needs for
the rural population.
To obtain a more complete assessment of the impacts of different
population trends on resource and service demands it is necessary to
go beyond simple per capita ratios and examine the effect of changing
population age composition on such demands. Figure 10-29 illustrates
the relationships between age composition and demands for a number
of services. These data show that demands for educational services, for
example, occur largely between the ages of 5 and 20, with a peak at age
10. Housing requirements, on the other hand, increase during the later
years of childbearing and hold steady until the age of retirement. Jobs
are in demand during the labor-force participation ages of 15 to 65.
Food requirements increase until the late teens, peaking at about age
18; after a slight decline they then level off and remain constant. Final-
ly, health-service demands are relatively high for infants and older
adults. These agegroups have the highest incidence of illness and re-
quire the most hospitalization.
Illness and hospitalization rates tend to be higher among adults at g d
allages above 50 than among children in the 0-5 agegroup. Never-
S.LNV.L
theless,because of their relatively large numbers in high fertility
populations, young children generate a significant proportion of the









































mds may be obtained
hus, for example, cur-
opulation may be ap-
velop estimates of the
er, as in the case f
mands for health per-
Lgpopulationbut also
8 indicates that this
eloped countries, may
ries reach a relatively
eeds to be taken into
ents. Health-service
are generally much
)untry (see, for exam-
mtries are striving to
d rural areas in the
vice ratios are made-
health-care needs for
impacts of different
ds it is necessary to
he effect of changing
ure 10-29 illustrates
mands for a number
cational services, for
0, with a peak at age
ease during the later
of retirement. Jobs
n ages of 15 to 65.
eaking at about age
lain constant. Final-
r infants and older
ce of illness and re-
Ler among adults at
5 agegroup. Never-
rs in high fertility
t proportion of the
oes not reduce total
S








00) IDIn• C1 r-4
S.LWViI8VHNI 000'OI dBd SNVIZISAHd












in the proportion of
portion of older adul




rates among U.S. a









to suicide and homi
form or another ac
the 15-24 agegroup
aggregate rate for i
Heart diseases bi
on according to Ta
Table10-16.Expe
Various Ages: Unil




















'I". — • — ' •





BIRTH5IO 20 30 40 50 607075
AGE
Source:Corsa and Oakley (6) (1971), p. 370.
Figure10-29. Time Relationships between a Birth and FutureService Require-
ments
Table10-15.Projected Service Ratios per 10,000 Population, Thailand, 1970






as a whole Bangkok Rest of Thailand
Hospital
beds 9.14 41.55 5.86
Physicians .90 7.27 .32
Nurses 2.03 14.24 .92
Practical nurses 1.29 3.76 1.01
Midwives .88 .57 .91
Sanitarians .70 .71 .66
Dentists .098 .71 .043


















health-care requirements, however, because the corresponding decline
in the proportion of young children is offset by the increase in the pro-
portion of older adults.
Much of the variability in rates of illness (morbidity) and death
(mortality) among different age and sex groups in a population can be
attributed to differences in their underlying cause-of-illness or cause-
of-death structure. By way of illustration, Table 10-16 presents death
rates among U.S. and Swedish males, by cause of death, for three
broad age groups. These data reveal a striking variation of mortality
with age.
Teenagers and young adults in the United States are, on the
average, very healthy, and their probabilities of dying of diseases are
extremely small. Their probabilities of dying in accidents, however, are
not that small, especially for males. Table 10-16 indicates that out of
100,000 U.S. males at age 15, over 1,100 will die in accidents before
reaching age 25. More than half of these will lose their lives in
automobile accidents. Combining these totals with deaths attributable
to suicide and homicide, we find that deaths caused by violence in one
form or another accounted for three out of every four male deaths in
the 15-24 agegroup. This is in marked contrast to the corresponding
aggregate rate for all U.S. males, which is o'e in every ten.
Heart diseases become the major cause of death from about age 35
on according to Table 16. Approximately one out of every hundred
Table10-16.Expected Number ofDeaths,by Cause, per100,000 Malesat
Various Ages: United States,1968, and Sweden, 1967
cause of Death
United States (whitena/es only) Sweden

























































Homicide 75 98 62 9 4 9
All causes 1,690 3,458 21,902 1,045 2.286 13.410
ource: l'uchs(11)(1974),pp.41-45.212Alternatives for Growth
whiteAmerican males dies of a heart attack or related disease in the
35-44 age group. Neoplasms, especially lung cancer, and cirrhosis of
the liver, both become important causes of death among American
males starting at age 35. Thus the combined impact of smoking and
drinking on health is considerable.
The probabilities of dying during the ten-year period between ages
55 and 64 are substantially higher than during the entire forty-year
period between ages 15 and 55. The principal reason is the striking in-
crease in the probabilities of dying from a heart attack. According to
Table 10-16, the death rate of this cause is then times greater during
late middle age than it is at ages 35-44, and over half of all deaths in
the former agegroup are attributable to it. The chances of dying from
lung cancer also increase to more than ten times the rate observed at
ages 35-44.
A comparison of the U.S. and Swedish male death rates (Table
10-16) sheds some light on the character of health problems among
American males. Largely because of the high rate of violent deaths,
the U.S. rate at ages 15-24 is more than 60 percent higher than the cor-
responding rate in Sweden. The number of violent deaths per 100,000
individuals is 83 percent higher in the United States than in Sweden,
whereas the corresponding differential in nonviolent deaths is only 16
percent.
The pattern changes in the 35-44 age group as the differential in
deaths from violence declines and the differential in deaths from heart
diseases increases substantially. Between ages 55 and 65 the U.S.
death rate is 63 percent higher than the corresponding rate in Sweden,
and the U.S. rate for heart diseases is approximately double the
Swedish rate.
As better control over such diseases as typhoid fever, diphtheria,
whooping cough, and measles leads to major declines in mortality
levels, death rates provide an increasingly incomplete description of a
national population's general health status. Illnesses and disabilities
associated with arthritis, mental illness, and sight and hearing pro-
blems are not reflected in mortality statistics, yet much of a nation's
requirements for health care are connected with such illnesses and
disabilities. Moreover, as more people survive to older ages, chronic
degenerative diseases, including heart disease, cancer, and stroke,
become more common. Finally, it is important to recognize that future
demands for health services also depend on the combined influences of
a number of factors besides population. These include national deci-
sions about the importance of health goals relative to other goals, na-
tional decisions regarding the health-service functions that should be
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developments,and levels of intenational technical assistance (Corsa
and Oakley, 1971).
POLICY ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS
Scholars and policymakers often disagree when it comes to evaluating
the desirability of current rates of rapid urbanization and massive
rural-urban migration in the less developed world. Some see these
trends as effectively speeding up national processes of socioeconomic
development, while others believe their consequences to be largely
undesirable and argue that both trends should be slowed down.
Those taking the negative view argue that most developing coun-
tries are "over-urbanized" in the sense that urban growth rates have
greatly outdistanced rates of industrial development and economic
growth. This has created an imbalance that finds cities in the less
developed world perpetually struggling with crisis. Despite substan-
tial gains in industrial production, new jobs do not appear at anywhere
near the rates required to employ a significant portion of the growing
urban labor force. Despite impressive improvements in urban housing,
food availability, educational services, and transportation facilities,
squatter settlements proliferate, hunger and ffliteracy are in evidence
everywhere, and traffic congestion is worse than before. And, most im-
portant, resources that could otherwise be applied to more directly and
immediately productive uses instead must be diverted to satisfy the
ever-growing demands for urban social services and infrastructure.
Supporters of current urbanization and migration patterns in
developing countries point to the modernizing benefits of urbanization
and to the improved well-being of most rural-urban migrants. They
contend that urbanization transforms people's outlook and behavioral
patterns, while broadening their skills and fostering in them the
greater acceptability of innovations and rationality necessary for
generating sustained wealth and power in a modern society. They also
argue that concern on welfare grounds is probably misplaced, because
despite job insecurity and squalid living conditions, most rural-urban
migrants are better off than they were prior to their move. Their
transfer from the farm to the city enables them to raise their personal
income and to obtain social services of a much wider variety and
superior quality than were available to them before.
The three population-related policies most frequently suggested for
dealing with the urbanization problems of less developed nations are
fertility reduction, economic development, and a redistribution of the
urban population away from the largest cities. Countries that have
achieved a high standard of living, it is pointed out, also have ex-214Alternatives for Growth
periencedsignificant declines in their birth rates. And sustained reduc-
tions in birth rates have not been accomplished without significant
economic growth. Moreover, there is also some evidence that costs of
services and environmental damages increase markedly with city size.
Yet, although there is evidence to support all of these points, it is by no
means irrefutable. Fertility declines have occurred without economic
growth. Economic growth has occurred alongside population growth.
And convincing arguments have been put forward against a narrow
cost-minimization perspective in the debate on city size.
In this paper we have outlined what we believe to be three major
components of any complete analysis of human settlement problems:
(1) the demographics of rapid urbanization;(2) its demoeconomic
development aspects; and (3) the resource-service demands that it
generates. A great deal more needs to be learned about these three pro-
cesses before convincing evidence can be marshaled for or against
rapid rates of urbanization. This evidence could shed some light on the
following three important policy questions:
1.Is it high fertility or high rural-urban migration that is the principal cause
of current rapid rates of urbanization and urban growth in less developed
countries, and which of these two components of population change
should receive the major attention of national population policy?
2.Is a strategy of rapid industrialization, with its predominantly urban bias,
the appropriate modelfor most developing countries,orshould
agricultural and rural development programs play a much larger role than
they do today?
3.Are the major urban agglomerations in the less developed world too large
and do they consume a disproportionately large share of national
resources and services, or is the problem one not of urban size but of urban
growth management?
The countries of the less developed world are currently faced with
the problem of accommodating more people in urban areas within a
shorter period of time than did the developed countries. The dimen-
sions of the task confronting the cities of developing nations are,
therefore, truly gargantuan. But there are grounds for optimism, since
accelerating population increases in urban areas have been absorbed at
rising income levels in a number of developing countries. What is sore-
ly needed, however, is enlightened management of the urbanization
process to remove systemic inefficiencies and inequalities, and
simultaneous preparation of already growing cities for a very much
larger increment of growth in the future.
Mi
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ProfessorRogers has presented a detailed review of observ-
ed differences in urban and rural economic choices and
status. He outlines potential problems associated with rapid
rates of urban growth and urbanization. The principal focus of his ex
amination is the direct and interactive effects of migration, urbaniza-
tion, and resource utilization on the developmental process. The
Rogers framework of analysis includes the influence of population
growth on national and per capita income. In these comments, I will
explicitly state the economic model of migration and examine it in
light of Rogers's analysis. Next, the influence of population growth on
the age structure and composition of the dependent population will be
explored; and finally the use of dependency ratios to determine invest-
ment and economic growth is reviewed.
MIGRATION AND NATIONAL INCOME
An individual's decision to leave a current job and community to
migrate to a new geographic region can be treated as an investment
decision. The worker recognizes the future earnings pattern available
in an existing location and compares this value to alternative
estimates of income opportunities in other areas minus the cost of
relocation. The following model, whose origins are attributed to
Sjaastad,' indicates the present value in discrete time associated with
a move from area jtoarea
TYkft) —Y•(t) Pv=t0(1 + r)'
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•whereYk(t) is the expected earnings2 in area k at time t; Y(t)isthe an-
ticipated earnings in area jattime t; T is the remaining years of work;
r is the discount rate the individual applies to the earnings streams;
and Crepresentsthe direct cost of moving assumed to occur entirely in
the first period. Of course, the model can easily be expanded to include
the value of nonpecuniary returns to both areas. In addition, demand
for services such as education and health for one's children may in-
fluence location decisions.
The implication of this migration model is that individuals, as
Rogers states, "migrate in search of improved social and economic op-
portunities." Workers make locational decisions in an attempt to max-
imize the present value of their lifetime earnings or utility. This model
clearly states that the individual operating with full information will
have improved his or her economic well-being following migration. At
various points, Rogers wonders whether individuals, regions, or the
nation as a whole gain from migration. For example, he states:
The problems created by this transformation [urban growth and ur-
banization] are manifold and involve large private and social costs. But
there are obvious benefits, too, and it is important to keep these in mind
when considering policies for intervening in the urbanization process.
[Emphasis added.]
Can the individual who moves be made worse off by a decision to
relocate? While imperfect information can produce ex post suboptimal
outcomes, migration is expected to increase the well-being of movers3
with informational networks, thatis,friends and relatives,
newspapers, and so on, arising to generate the needed flow of
knowledge. The improved status of migrants does not, however, insure
a positive net benefit to either the region or the nation as a whole. The
improved status of the migrant is not a sufficient condition to provide
a net gain to the economy due to the possibilties of externalities and
returns to scale in the production of goods. Differences between social
costs and returns and private expenditures and receipts might provide
a rationale for a public policy aimed at increasing or decreasing
migratory flows.
Externalities produced by expansion of city size may be either
positive or negative. Rogers focuses on the negative aspects of urban
growth such as pollution or congestion. His analysis would seem to im-
ply ihat if new migrants were forced to pay the of urban growth such
as pollution or congestion. His analysis would seem to imply that if
new migrants were forced to pay the full social costs of their reloca-
tion, fewer people would be drawn to urban areas. Thurow states the
problem in the following manner:
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Privateincomes may increase enough to more than make up for the costs
of moving, but the social costs of accommodating people in a crowded ur-
ban area may exceed the net private gain. More public services must be
provided, and congestion may increase.4
The magnitude and nature of externalities can be expected to depend
on urban characteristics, perhaps, to the extent that generalities can-
not be made.
For society to be made worse off from migration, the full social costs
of relocation, including these externalities, would have to be greater
than the social gain from increased production attributable to workers
finding employment with higher productivity than in their old
residences. To the extent that higher levels of social services are pro-
vided in the urban areas—welfare benefits, subsidized housing, school-
ing—the difference between private and social gains may be widened,.
and it is possible that people will give up employment in rural areas to
draw these benefits in cities. This, however, begs the question of why
such differentials exist. Political and social hypotheses may be put for-
ward to explain the existence of state-supported urban-rural differen-
tials in social services, such as greater likelihood of revolution among
disgruntled masses, urban poverty is more visible, and the like. But
there may be economic rationales influencing these government deci-
sions. Public policy may be explicitly directed toward increasing ur-
banization in the belief that there is a positive codecisions. Public
policy may be explicitly directed toward increasing urbanization in the
belief that there is a positive correlation between these migrational
flows and economic development. The government may also recognize
economies of scale in the production and supply of these services.
If social services are financed by the local area, the inflow of new
migrants may increase the tax load on the existing inhabitants
relative to the benefits that the newcomer provides. The possibility
then exists that the individual and the nation may benefit by migra-
tion while the previous inhabitants of a particular city or region might
suffer. In the case of social services, the increased tax burden on the
long-term residents arise because of a pricing policy that provides
them below costs and thus implies income transfers to the newcomers.
In way of summary, Greenwood stated in his review of the migration
literature that "little empirical work has attempted to measure the
magnitudes of externalities associated with migration."5
Henderson argues that if the social and private costs of externalities
are equated, cities will reorder their production priorities away from
the goods that are producing the pollution or other externality. The
adverse effect of the reduction in the production of the polluting com-
modity "will be more than offset by the increase in output of other
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goods and the decline in pollution. Welfare of city residents will rise,
and immigration to the city from the rest of the economy will then oc-
cur."6 Thus, under certain conditions, an optimal taxing or pricing of
an externality—pollution, congestion, and so on—may increase the
well-being of the city dwellers at the existing urban population size,
which will induce migration to the city, increasing its size.
Migration into large urban areas might also create additional
burdens to a society if the production of social goods and services were
characterized by decreasing returns to scale. In such a case the
marginal and average costs of providing housing, education, and other
services would increase as the population of the region rose. The in-
ference is that it would have cost the society less to provide these ser-
vices to new migrants in their old location. A recent study using U.S.
data estimated that the production functions of urban services ex-
hibited constant returns to scale across the entire sample.7
Arguing that urban production functions will exhibit increasing
returns to scale, Goldstein and Moses conclude that the growth of ur-
ban areas"isintimately related toscale and agglomerative
economies.' '8Inhis review of the internal migration literature, Green-
wood concludes that "migration has historically been an important
means by which these economies have been achieved in urban areas."9
Kuznets, in his Modern Economic Growth, states that "urbanization
is a necessary condition for industrialization and modern economic
growth and essential to the economies of scale of modern industry."0
An additional concern stated by Rogers is that rural-to-urban
migration increases city size, thus "reducing the per capita endow-
ment of capital" in the urban area. Increases in the supply of labor in a
particular region would be expected to generate downward pressure on
wage rates; however, in the rural region wages should increase.
Migratory flows that tend to equalize returns to capital and labor in
the different areas within an economy are contributing to efficient
allocation of resources. Therefore, reduced urban wages caused by the
inflow of rural labor should not be considered an externality unless
property rights on the existing capital stock and technology have been
assigned to the initial urban workers.
These studies seem to indicate that the nation as a whole would tend
to benefit from migration in the following manner: first, as workers
move to areas where their productivity and earnings are greater, na-
tional and per capita income rise; second, the net negative values of ex-
ternalities are typically not sufficient to offset these income gains, and
if property taxed may contribute to increased city size; and finally,
some evidence exists that indicates urban services are produced under
constant or increasing returns to scale. This explanation is consistent
with results of Yap'1
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withresults of Yap'1 that are cited in detail by Rogers. I might add
that in any theoretical economic framework, unrestrained movement
of resources is a necessary condition for efficient production and the
achievement of maximum output. Thus, a government policy to
restrict or retard the flow of labor within a country might significantly
impair the economy's ability to respond to economic fluctuations.
POPULATION GROWTH, AGE STRUCTURE CHANGES
AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
Professor Rogers outlines a framework that links population growth,
investment, and per capita income. His reasoning is that a nation with
a rapidly increasing population "will be able to add less to the produc.
tive capacity of the economy than a population experiencing a less
rapid rate of labor-force growth." This decline in investment occurs
because "the pressure for allocating a much higher proportion of the
national product for consumption then would be greater in the higher
fertility population because of its higher dependency burden."
This is, of course, the traditional hypothesis of the interaction of
population growth and economic wellbeing. It was stated forcefully
by Spengler over two decades ago:
Population growth is a major obstacle to economic betterment in most
parts of the world. It is retarding capital formation, accelerating the rate
of depletion of the world's limited store of nonreplaceable resources,
augmenting the rise of costs in increasing cost industries, and
decelerating the rate of increase of per capita income.12
The tenet that population growth retards and has slowed past
economic growth is not, however, a uniformly accepted belief. Kuznets
found that "no clear association appears to exist in the present sample
of countries, or is likely in other developed countries, between rates of
growth of population and product per capita."3 In his examination of
76 less-developed countries over a period of ten years, Alfred Sauvy
estimated no significant correlation between the rate of growth of
population and national per capita income.'4
Some researchers have outlined the economic advantages of popula-
tion growth. These factors may. include: existence of economies of scale
in some industries; with fixed firm size, population growth may in-
crease competition; higher proportion of capital stock is of a new vin-
tage;'5 enhances vertical mobility of labor; and easier adaptability to
economic change.'6
While I do not wish to argue in favor of rapid population growth, I
believe it would be useful in the framework of this conference to
7
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analyze the implication of population increases on the ability of the
economy to generate investment. My examination will focus on:
(1) relating fertility decisions to a family choice model; (2) expenditures
on children as a form of investment; and (3) the use of dependency
ratios to determine savings capacity.
HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS DECISIONS
Much of the analysis of the impact of children on aggregate saving
concludes that increases in the number of children raises the number of
consumers without 4ncreasing production; therefore, to maintain con-
sumption standards, savings must be reduced.
Before continuing, we must reach agreement on the definition of in-
vestment. Expenditures that increase the ability of society to generate
output in subsequent periods are described as investment, and these
expenditures can be on either physical or human capital. Much of the
public and private expenditures on children directly influence the
income-generating capacity of the economy by increasing the stock of
human capital.For example, educational expenditures provide
children with the training and work skills that enable them to be more
productive during their worklives. Thus, one must be cautious in
describing the influence of children on household savings. The
presence of children may induce the family to reduée its savings in the
form of physical assets and bank accounts while it is increasing its in-
vestment in the human capital of the children.
Schultz estimated that the stock of education embodied in the labor
force rose by 8.5 times from 1900 to 1956, compared to an increase of
4.5 times for reproducible capital.17 Growth in national income is a
function of physical capital accumulation and changes in its produc-
tivity, increases in per capita human capital, and changes in the ag-
gregate stock of human capital due to population changes. Selowsky
estimated that for the United States, improvements in the average
level of educational attainment accounted for 0.52 percent of the an-
nual growth rate between 1940-1965. Maintaining the same per capita
educational levels with population growth contributed 0.33 percent to
the rate of growth of national income.18 Therefore, all public and
private expenditures on children should not be allocated to consump-
tion, but instead should include a definite investment component.
Kelley has argued that expenditures on children need not be
substitutes for family savings, but may represent a reordering of the
family consumption pattern. In addition, the presence of children may
induce different patterns of market work (more or less) and might en-
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family objective function. He concludes that "hard evidence on the
relationship between family size and household savings is almost
nonexistent."19 Household decisions about the number and quality of
children and the consumption of other commodities have been analyz-
ed in a utility framework by Becker and Lewis. Their model shows the
interactive nature of family decisions about family size and levels of
consumption.20 Thus, the influence of children on family savings in
both human and physical assets is not certain.
POPULATION AGE-STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT
SPENDING ON DEPENDENTS
To examine the aggregate influence of alternative levels of population
growth and the implied dependency burden, we employ age structure
data developed by Coale and Demeny for a stable population of males
exhibiting Western mortality rates. Five rates of population growth
are shown in Table 11-1, along with the resulting age structure. Defin-
ing the labor force as 20-64, the proportion of the population in this
agegroup is at its highest for a stable or slightly declining population.
For a zero population growth rate, 57.43 percent of the population is in
the working years while 15.95 percent would be retired and 26.63 per-
cent were young dependents. By comparison, a nation growing at 2
percent per year has only 50 percent of its population in the labor force
with 43 percent below age 20 and 7 percent age 65 and over.
Individuals outside the arbitrarily defined working ages are assign-
ed to a dependent status presumably because they are adding to con-
sumption but are not contributing to production. We must recognize
that participation in the labor force is an individual decision, therefore
not all those of working age will be in the labor force, while the entirety
of those of dependent ages will not refrain from market participation.
In addition, why should we call aged individuals dependents when
they are living on the income from the assets that they have ac-
cumulated? Are those who have chosen to continue to invest in human
capital formation dependents?
The conclusion of an increasing "dependency burden" with higher
rates of population growth would seem obvious upon examination of
Table 11-1. Two points, however, should be stressed: first, the reduc-
tion in the dependency ratio with decreased population growth is sen-
sitive to the age of entry into the labor force and the retirement from
it; and second, expenditures on young and old dependents might have
a differential impact on the economy. Table 11-2 shows that if the age
of entry into the labor force is lowered to 15, the difference between the
proportion of the population in the labor force in the no-growth popula-
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Table 11-1.Rate of Population Growth and Age Structure
Rate of GrowthinStable Population (percent)
Percent in Age Group —0.5 0 0.5 1 2
0-14 16.99 19.99 23.20 26.60 33.73
15-19 5.94 6.64 7.33 7.99 9.14
20-54 45.08 45.62 45.66 45.22 43.07
55-59 6.64 6.09 5.50 4.91 3.76
60-64 6.40 5.72 5.04 4.39 3.20
65-69 5.91 5.15 4.43 3.76 2.61
65 and over 18.95 15.95 13.26 10.89 7.10
20-64 58.12 57.43 56.20 54.52 50.03
20-69 64.13 62.58 60.63 59.28 52.64
18-64 60.50 60.09 59.13 57.72 51.85
Source: A.J. Coale and Paul Demeny, Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Populations
(Princeton, 1966), p. 168.
Table 11-2.Age Structure and Population Growth
Rate Percent of Total Population Aged:
of Growth 20-64 20-59 20-54 20-69 15-64 15-59 /5-54
—0.5 58.12 51.72 45.08 64.13 64.06 57.66 51.02
0 57.43 51.71 45.62 62.58 64.07 58.35 52.26
0.5 56.20 51.16 45.66 60.63 63.53 58.49 52.99
1.0 54.52 49.48 44.57 59.28 62.51 57.47 52.56
2.0 50.03 48.83 43.07 52.64 59.17 55.97 52.21
Source: Table 11-1.
tion and one that is increasing is significantly narrowed. A decline in
age of withdrawal from the labor force has a similar effect. For exam-
ple, if the labor force is defined as the population 15-54, there is virtual-
ly no difference in the total dependency ratios for annual growth rates
between 0 and 2 percent. This sensitivity of the relative size of the
working-age population with changes in the ages of entry and retire-
ment imply that generalizations about population growth and
dependency ratios must be made with considerable caution. With
economic development, two of the dominant labor-force participation
trends are earlier retirement and later entry into the labor force. As
previously stated, these patterns of labor supply exert conflicting
pressures on the relative size of the dependent populations under alter-
native fertility assumptions.
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The composition of the dependent population must also be examin-
ed if the impacts of changing age structures are to be related to na-
tional and per capita income. Let us once again define the labor force to
be composed of individuals 20-64, with the remaining agegroups
classified as dependents. The proportion of all dependents who are
below the age of entry into labor varies directly with the population
growth rate, as follows:
The changing composition of the dependent population raises the
following two questions:(1) Isthe cost of maintaining young
dependents the same as that for older ones? (2) Are the public and
private costs of supporting the two groups of the same nature? If the
costs of supporting an older dependent is greater than that of main-
taining children, the burden of dependency costs with increasing
population growth rates may be reversed. Using U.S. data, Clark and
Spengler have estimated that the annual public cost of supporting an
older dependent is three times that of a youth; however, greater in-
trafamily transfers are usually made to children.2' We can incorporate
the higher costs of supporting the elderly to estimate an adjusted
dependency burden in the following manner: let X represent the cost of
supporting a child, and aXthecost of maintaining an older dependent.
Then the adjusted dependency burden is X + aX.Ahigher support
cost of as low as 50 percent is sufficient to reverse the pattern of in-
creased dependency burden with population growth. Of course these
ratios are also sensitive to the definition of the working age popula-
tion:
In addition to the differences in the level of transfers to the two
groups, the very nature of the spending may be different. We have
previously argued that to a significant degree the. expenditures on
children represents investment in human capital formation, while
transfers to the elderly are more likely to be for current consumption.
Thus, in a rapidly growing population, more of the dependency costs
will be for investment than in a no-growth society.
This analysis leads one to conclude that researchers should not look
only at dependency ratios based on a single definition of the labor force
to assess the impact of population growth on the ability of an economy
to generate investment and thus influence the capital-labor ratio and
per capita income. I have attempted to illustrate several critical
variables that must be considered in examining population growth and
economic development, including sensitivity to the age boundaries of
the labor force, cost of young versus old dependents, and the invest-
ment component of expenditures for youths. Shifts in the population
Ii228 Alternatives for Growth
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age structure will also influence economic growth due to differential
patterns of savings, productivity, and earnings over the life cycle.
I would like to contribute one final comment as it pertains to a state-
ment about mobility of the dual career family. Rogers writes that
"economic development stimulates the labor-force participation of
wives, and working wives reduce the ease with which couples can
relocate." While the few existing studies provide weak support of this
hypothesis,22 and my intuition is to concur, I remain unconvinced that
this is necessarily the direction of causation, and certainly the
theoretical result is ambiguous. For example, the typical unskilled
worker who migrates quits his job in one city, and following relocation,
searches for new employment in the new region. Presumably the
worker was responding to wage differentials in the two locations. If
the same family has two earners, the gain from such a move will be
greater upon the reemployment of both workers. Of course, costs have
also risen with higher family opportunity costs due to foregone earn-
ings.
Professional workers more frequently already have new jobs prior to
relocation. Thus, if both earners are professionals, mobility may be
hindered by the need to secure two jobs. However, upward mobility in
a corporate society is dependent on wiffingness of individuals to move
to various locations as they progress up the business hierarchy.
Therefore, the existence of two such workers in a single family may in-
crease the frequency of opportunities for the family to transfer while
one member receives a promotion in the same firm and the other
searches for new employment. The most significant result of the in-
creasing incidence of dual career families as it relates to Roger's paper
may be the tendency of such families to locate in major metropolitan
areas where job opportunities are more diverse and more suitable to
accommodate two workers from the same family.
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Asa discussant, one is usually faced with the choice of
carefully reviewing the maj or paper for one of two primary
reasons: (1) to unearth relatively minor details for purposes
of not necessarily constructive criticism; or (2) to find points that per-
mit further elaboration or extension of the major paper. This paper
reflects the second approach, and may be viewed as an extension of Dr.
Rogers's fine paper in that it focuses on issues relating to rural
development and some of the policy implications for this sort of
development.
As the title indicates, the paper initially views issues of rural
development from a demographic perspective, treating separately the
questions of fertility and migration. The aim in doing so is to preserve
the notion of demographic transition, with its separate natural in-
crease and mobility components, as outlined previously by Dr. Rogers.
FERTILITY
It is a demographic axiom that fertility in rural areas will, as a rule, ex-
ceed that of urban areas. Because of a paucity of reliable fertility data
in most portions of the Third World, one is forced to seek confirmation
of this assertation by examination of relatively crude measures such as
the child-woman ratio. While this is a far from perfect measure,1 it is
about the only tool available for our purposes. It is certainly clear from
the imperfect and far from complete data in Table 12-1 that fertility
among both the rural and urban residents of developed countries is
substantially lower than that in developing countries. Continuing high
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fertilityin the rural portions of developing countries will only continue
to add, as Dr. Rogers has suggested, to continued population growth
in urban areas through inmigration from rural areas in search of
employment opportunities. These rural dwellers swell the urban
population both directly (through their inmigration) and indirectly2
(through reproduction).
As a consequence, declines in rural fertility will enhance develop-
ment by reducing population pressure in both the rural and urban por-
tions of a country. The mere fact of population growth, it might be
argued, aids as a deterrent to economic and technological advance,
simply because it requires a larger share of investible resources to be
devoted to equipping the new entrants to the labor force (that is, main-
taining a constant capital-labor ratio), rather than increasing the
amount and quality of capital available per worker.3 Additionally, a
high rate of population growth necessarily implies a very large share of
young dependents in the population. Not only do these persons con-
sume but not produce (thus decreasing the share of total income that
can be saved), but given current levels of infant mortality, many of
them will die prior to reaching labor-force age.
Perhaps the major question that has confounded persons interested
in the roll of population growth in the development process is whether
reduced population growth is a precondition to economic development,
or vice versa. This latter concept is perhaps best stated by Kingsley
Davis,4 who forcefully argues that family planning programs per se
(that is, programs aimed at reducing population growth on the
assumption that this will enhance development) ignore entirely the
motives of individuals regarding their own reproductive behavior.
Thus, a successful family planning program will allow the individual to
attain desired family size but, according to Davis, this size may well be
consistent with fairly high rates of population growth.
Economic development, therefore, might be supposed to reduce fer-
tility, by affecting the motivations of individuals to reproduce. Con-
sider some of the possible motivations for desiring a fairly large family
in a developing society: the additional social pressure to insure a male
heir; the need for old-age security; and the supply of relatively inexpen-
sive labor to assist in cultivating the family holding. The process of
economic development is likely to mitigate all of these pressures to
some extent. Along with economic development is likely to come a
sharp decline in infant mortality; as this ensues (given time for
recognition of this change), fertility will decline, simply because fewer
children will be required to ensure the survival of a male child to
adulthood. This factor, along with the growth and development of
some sort of social welfare system, should also mitigate the old-age
security issue. Finally, if improvements in agricultural technology are
sufficiently diffused,
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sufficiently diffused, the need for additional farm labor becomes pro-
portionally less.
As the situation stands at present, it is frequently argued that the
marginal productivity of farm labor in many developing countries ap-
proximates zero, and this fact alone contributes substantially to rural-
urban migration in these nations. This might make the rural sector
better off in the sense that their own output might be shared by fewer
persons (or, at least, that per capita income or consumption would
rise), but—as Todaro has demonstrated—not have much effect on the
well-being of the migrant, given the possibility of a low probability of
finding employment. Indeed, Todaro suggests that it is difficult to
reduce substantially "the size of the urban traditional sector without a
concentrated effort at making rural life more attractive."5 One means
of doing this is to allocate capital funds for improving rural amenities,
thus increasing the real income of rural residents relative to urban
residents, and reducing the relative strength of the rural push or urban
pull.
The role that improvements in income or other measures of well-
being actually have on reproductive ideals and performance is another
topic that has been the subject of considerable debate among scholars
over the past decade. While time and space do not permit an analysis
of the differences between the so-called Becker and Easterlin
"schools" of the economic determinants of fertility, a recent study by
Sanderson concludes that agreement on two major points (role of be-
quests or expenditures per child as fertility determinants, and the role
of intergenerational perceptions of income as a determinant of fer-
tility) has been reached.6 In other words, according to Sanderson, "It
is possible to entertain both the hypothesis that parents' aspirations
for their own standard of living and bequests for their children depend,
in part, on their background and the hypothesis that the parents'
aspirations for their children's standard of living as well as their own
depend, in part, on their current income."7
Through what might be termed a critical minimum effort thesis, it
may be alleged that fertility will decline as development progresses.
The United Nations describes this hypothesis as follows: "In a
developing country where fertilityisinitiallyhigh, improving
economic and social conditions are likely to have little if any effect un-
til a certain economic and social level is reached; but once that level is
achieved, fertility is likely to enter a decided decline and to continue
downward until it is again stabilized in a much lower plane."8
This hypothesis suggests that a minimum threshold of development
must be attained as a precondition to fertility diminution and the
subsequent reduction of. population growth rates, in the manner of the
natural increase component of the demographic transition described
previously by Dr. Rogers.234Alternatives for Growth
An important addendum to this hypothesis has recently been ad-
vanced by Kocher,9 who suggests that a wide diffusion of rural
development and equality in the distribution of the development pro-
cess and its benefits will lead to more rapid modernization among a
relatively larger share of the rural population, which will lead to a more
widespread desire for smaller families and earlier, more rapid, and sus-
tained declines in fertility. The overall framework is outlined by
Kocher as follows:'0
1.Population growth, whatever the level, is not an obstacle to
growth of per capita agricultural output.
2.In most developing countries, new agricultural technology is a
precondition for agricultural growth and development.
3.The degree to which diffusion of technology and other developmen-
tal processes will be widespread depends on government policies
and domestic institutions.
4.If these diffusions are widely diffused so that the distribution of
the benefits of development is fairly widespread, the standard of
living will rise and a more modern life-style will be adopted by a
majority of the rural population. Based on the reasoning of the
economics of fertility outlined above, this will cause an increase in
parents' aspirations for themselves and their children, which
should lower desired family size. It is at this point that an effective
family program can hasten and facilitate a spontaneous decline in
fertility.
5.Finally, if the diffusion of innovation is limited by institutions,
policies, or both, then a dualistic pattern of rural development will
ensue, with the bulk of developmental efforts being shared by a
privileged few, while the majority of ruraldwellerswill continue
their traditional mode of life.
If the diffusion of rural development is not widespread, then there is
no incentive for the disenchanted rural resident to remain at home.
Hence, nondiffused rural development only adds to the rural-urban
migration movement.
MIGRATION
As noted above, rural-to-urban migration customarily occurs because
of some combination of what demographers call push and pull forces.
As Everett Lee has described it: "In every area there are countless fac-
tors which act to hold people within the area or attract people to it, and
there are others which tend to repel them." These factors vary with
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individuals,but each weighs the positive and negative factors of the
current place of residence vis-á-vis those of competing places of
residence and, theoretically, decides: (1) whether to move; and if so
(2) to which competing area.
For the case of developing countries the rural resident will be faced
with a substantial (and probably growing) differential in urban-rural
income (pull), and the prospect of little advance in economic status
within the rural community (push). Even given the low probability of
employment in the urban area, the individual might decide that, from a
private perspective, the benefits of migration outweigh the costs.
From the viewpoint of society, however, the public costs of this migra-
tion might well outweigh the public benefits.12 A substantial portion
of the cost was alleviated in the past through emigration,'3 but for
presently developing countries such a mechanism has effectively
ceased to operate.
It has proved somewhat difficult to measure private and public
costs and benefits of internal rural-urban migration in developing
countries. Yap, in her review of the literature on the subject, finds that
"though there is a wide variation in the quality of the jobs obtained,
migrants seem to receive higher incomes in their destination than in
their place of origin."4 On the other hand, a summary report by the
National Academy of Sciences notes that studies usually indicate that
the costs of providing jobs for rural-urban migrants in developing
countries are so high that it is better (from a cost-benefit point of view)
to reduce drastically the volume of rural-urban migration and make all
possible efforts to keep prospective migrants in their (rural) place of
origin. However, the Academy notes that while "it is difficult to argue
with the arithmetic of these studies...itcan be asked if they are at-
tuned to the reality of the situation. A similar study in the period of in-
tense urbanization of now developed countries would probably have
yielded the same conclusions.' '15
Rural-urban migration, then, might be a phenomenon which is an in-
tegral part of the development process.'6 As such, the question that
might appropriately be asked is not whether steps should be taken to
curb this flow, but rather, Should it (and how should it) be rechan-
nelled? It should be noted that some claim that developing countries
are presently "overurbanized." Abu-Lughod summarizes the argu-
ment:
Many students of urbanization have suggested that countries in the ear-
ly stages of industrialization suffer an imbalance in both the size and
distribution of their urban populations, implying primarily that they
have a higher percentage of people living in cities and towns than is
"warranted" at their state of economic development.17236Alternatives for Growth
Although this thesis, at least that portion dealing with the size of the
urban population, has been refuted by Sovani,18 Kamerschen,19 and
others, there remains the question of the maldistribution of the urban
population and the possible need to rechannel its growth.
RESOURCES AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
The urban pattern of most developing nations can be best characteriz-
ed as that of the "primate city," that is, one which is overwhelmingly
large in comparison with all other cities in the country "Commonly,
within developing countries there is no hierarchy of cities of various
sizes such as that found in developed nations, and primate cities most
frequently occur in countries with relatively low overall levels of ur-
banization."20 Hoselitz notes that such a system may be all that most
developing countries are capable of supporting, but that the system of
the primate city has harmful overall effects for several reasons: (1) the
depletion of valuable personnel from rural areas; (2) the consumption
of nearly all investment monies; (3) the subsequent prevention of the
development of other urban areas; and (4) a tendency toward relatively
high consumption and relatively low production.21 While in the course
of urbanization the development of an urban hierarchy in developing
countries is probably inevitable, much can be done to shape the mode
of this new urban development.
The logical means for this planned pattern of urban development is
to concentrate resource allocation in the presently rural sector, on the
theory that economic change in the rural sector will eventually create a
demand for urban-type development through specialization of labor
and increased demand for services. As Dr. Rogers notes in his paper,
this state of urban development customarily comes at a relatively late
stage in economic development—indeed, as he notes, it seems to be
presently occurring in the United States.
In order for such a program to succeed, it would seem that rural
development efforts, while based on agriculture, must go beyond this
into rural multisectional development. An example of this approach is
that presently taken by the World Bank, in what they term integrated
rural development projects. The ultimate aim is to improve the stan-
dard of living of rural residents by improving their productivity,
usually by introduction and expansion of technological change at the
micro level. In order to accomplish this, the World Bank believes that
three basic conditions must be met:22 (1) producers must know how to
increase their output; (2) they must have access to the means of in-
creasing their output; and (3) they must have the incentive to make the
effort and accept the risk associated with increasing their output. In
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orderto facilitate this process, bank projects are concentrated on effec-
tive means of delivering to farmers all necessary goods and services.
This includes not only capital inputs, but also such infrastructural
items as irrigation and transportation. While such a venture may
prove relatively costly in the short run, the long-run effects are likely
to see a balanced growth and development of rural and urban areas,
with a true urban hierarchy developed to service the needs of all
residents. This is a requirement in many developed, as well as develop-
ing, countries.23 The latter, however, have the opportunity of coping
with, and shaping their future, in a manner that will reflect and avoid
the mistakes made by now developed countries at similar stages of
their development.
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